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INTRODUCTION     
his Paper examines whether there is a case, in appropriate circum-
stances, to provide public funding for derivative claims.1 Claims 
are expensive, and their cost “is a major obstacle in the path of a minor-
                                                                                                  
 1. In this paper the terms “derivative claim(s)” and “derivative action(s)” are used 
interchangeably. Similarly, “firm,” “company,” and “corporation” are used interchangea-
bly to refer to a noncharitable limited liability incorporated company. 
T 
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ity shareholder bringing a derivative action on behalf of the company.”2 
For example, there is nothing in the relatively new derivative claims pro-
cedure in Part 11 of the UK Companies Act 2006 that will convince a 
rational shareholder he is better off litigating the case on behalf of the 
company rather than selling his shares.3 It is unnecessary to repeat my 
argument from 20044 and subsequent times5 that costs and fees rules 
need to be reevaluated if any real change is to occur.6 Indeed, 
the treatment of fees has a direct impact on the frequency [of claims]. 
The more advantageous the fee rule is to the prospective plaintiff, the 
greater the employment of litigation. This [is] significant for policy 
analysis as it assists in the creation of rules that permit judicial deter-
mination of questions deemed important to societal interests. An under-
standing of the economic effect of fees on the decision to commence 
litigation allows the development of rules to encourage those actions, 
which advance policy objectives. Underlying this analysis is the ques-
tion whether an action should be promoted or deterred. The determina-
tion of this question is a matter for legislation and judicial innovation.7 
The purpose of this Paper is to highlight and analyze an interesting re-
cent development, whereby public funding may be provided in specific 
cases to fund derivative claims. An amendment made to the Israeli Com-
panies Law of 19998 in May 2011 (“Amendment 16”) permits the Israeli 
Securities Authority (“ISA”) to fund derivative claims in cases where it 
                                                                                                  
 2. Arad Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions: A Re-examination of Costs and Fees 
as Incentives to Commence Litigation, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 345, 345 (2004) [hereinafter 
Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions]. 
 3. See Arad Reisberg, Derivative Claims under the Companies Act 2006: Much Ado 
About Nothing?, in RATIONALITY IN COMPANY LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DD PRENTICE 
17, 29, 51 (John Armour & Jennifer Payne eds., 2009) [hereinafter Reisberg, Derivative 
Claims]. 
 4. See generally Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2. 
 5. See generally Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and the Funding Problem: The 
Way Forward, 2006 J. BUS. L. 445 [hereinafter Reisberg, The Funding Problem]; see also 
ARAD REISBERG, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND 
OPERATION 222–73 (2007) [hereinafter REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION]. 
 6. Reisberg, Derivative Claims, supra note 3, at 366. As stated above, this is the 
author’s thesis that runs throughout his works. 
 7. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 346 (citing STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 492 (2004)); John D. Wilson, 
Attorney Fees and the Decision to Commence Litigation: Analysis, Comparison and an 
Application to the Shareholder’s Derivative Action, 5 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 
142, 171 (1985). 
 8. Companies Law, 5759–1999, 44 LSI 119 (1999) (Isr.) [hereinafter Companies 
Law], available at http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_958.pdf. 
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is convinced there is a public interest.9 This has the potential to be an 
important development for several reasons. First, it extends the discus-
sion on how to address the funding problem in derivative action proce-
dures beyond the common solutions (i.e. those involving various fee ar-
rangements such as costs orders, rewarding the plaintiff, or contingency 
fees) and its “usual suspects” (i.e. plaintiff shareholders or attorneys) to 
an entirely novel domain—that of a public regulator—and public funding 
for these private actions. Second, and directly related to the previous 
point, providing public funding for private actions cuts across the tradi-
tional public/private dichotomy. It shows that the choice lies not solely 
between private and public enforcement, but also between a private en-
forcement aided by a public body (i.e. privately initiated and pursued 
litigation which is publicly funded). Finally, the Israeli solution may of-
fer a new strategy to address a major concern in the literature on the the-
ory of litigation, namely, the basic problem that private incentives to liti-
gate may diverge from what is socially desirable and that strategies may 
be employed to tackle this.10 
In this Paper, I will discuss the problem of funding of derivative ac-
tions in a different taxonomy. Despite the various fee mechanisms and 
fee-favoring rules available under Israeli law before the introduction of 
Amendment 16, the fact that parties would still not pursue these claims 
demonstrates the underproduction of positive externalities. Thus if we 
are to motivate private actions by aggrieved parties, access to funding 
must be considered. Put simply, the policy underlying Amendment 16 
reveals a new truth: where lawsuits would produce collateral social bene-
fits, individuals are given financial support by a public body to litigate 
their claims. The new mechanism of a public body internalizing the cost 
(ISA), and thus enabling the lawsuits to be brought, helps produce these 
social benefits. 
The Paper is structured as follows. Section A will briefly explicate the 
economics of derivative claim litigation. Section B will then outline the 
derivative action procedure under Israeli Companies Law of 1999, look-
ing in particular at the various costs and fees arrangements under its re-
gime. It will also briefly look at the time, cost, and number of procedures 
usually expected to resolve a commercial dispute through the Israeli 
courts. Section C will examine the details of Amendment 16, from which 
derivative actions may be underwritten through public funds. It will also 
look into the rationales behind the law. Subsequently, this Paper will in-
                                                                                                  
 9. Id. § 209(a). 
 10. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 7, at 492–
93. 
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quire into the advantages (both theoretical and practical) of public fund-
ing of such claims as well as highlight the shortcomings of such an ap-
proach. As part of this consideration, class actions currently funded by 
ISA will be analyzed. Finally, the implications of the preceding discus-
sion will be examined and assessed in Section D with a view toward de-
termining whether public funding provides a way forward for the funding 
problem, and whether it could be extended to other jurisdictions. 
A. THE ECONOMICS OF DERIVATIVE CLAIM LITIGATION 
Derivative actions enable “shareholders, usually minority shareholders, 
. . . to enforce the company’s rights where directors have breached their 
duties (since in these circumstances it is unlikely that the directors, who 
usually act on behalf of the company, will want to take action).”11 The 
prosecuting shareholder is normally named as the plaintiff and the com-
pany named as nominal defendant,12 though this conceals the true nature 
of the parties. 
In reality the company is the true plaintiff in interest, and in all but ex-
ceptional cases any damages or other relief obtained flow directly to the 
company and not to the nominal plaintiff. This fact has a significant 
impact on the nominal plaintiff’s decision to commence litigation, as 
his interest in the outcome will generally be quite diffuse and remote.13 
In financial terms, a shareholder lacks any direct remedy that would 
make the action worthwhile for him or her. Despite success, “any dam-
ages recovered accrue to the company”14 and the shareholder will there-
fore receive only a pro rata share of the gains of a successful action.15 
Under English law, the shareholder may have to pay not only the ex-
penses of his or her litigation, but also the legal expenses of the defen-
                                                                                                  
 11. REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 1. 
 12. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nat’l Union of Mineworkers, [1985] B.C.L.C. 237 at 246 
(Eng.). The case is thus res judicata, i.e. the matter cannot be raised again, either in the 
same court or in a different court. 
 13. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 347. 
 14. Ian Ramsay, Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects 
For Statutory Derivative Action, 15 U. S. WALES L.J. 149, 163 (1992). 
 15. Id. Then only indirectly and to the extent that the proceedings cause the value of 
his own share to rise sufficiently, so that he might be willing to sue in order to sell his 
shares later at increased prices. This result, nonetheless, is far from certain as a successful 
action may reduce share values. Also, “shareholders who own small stakes in the com-
pany have little incentive to bring a derivative action because the benefit of the suit ac-
crues to shareholders according to the size of their holding, not their efforts in bringing 
the action.” REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 257–69 (emphasis in 
original). 
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dant if the action is unsuccessful.16 A prospective plaintiff, being aware 
that the company and other shareholders will “free-ride” on his or her 
efforts, is likely inclined to forgo suit in anticipation of other plaintiffs.17 
Ultimately, even if shareholder litigation results in intangible deterrence 
benefits, there is little reason for individual shareholders to sue. Conse-
quently, if all shareholders share this same view, “then no one is likely to 
step forward even in situations where litigation would increase total 
share value.”18 As I have explained, 
An imbalance therefore arises in derivative litigation, as the fees faced 
by the nominal plaintiff will, in most cases, outweigh the potential 
benefit accruing to him. This consequent deterrence to derivative ac-
tions is common to both the English and American fee rules. [As a re-
sult,] [r]ational plaintiffs [will] therefore . . . rarely initiate derivative 
actions. Empirically, however, this is not the case in the United States. 
The fact that the action is employed in the United States is due to ad-
justments in the usual cost rules, the most significant of which are the 
“common fund”, the “substantial benefit” doctrines and the recognition 
of contingency fee arrangements.19 
                                                                                                  
 16. Owing to the English “loser-pays” rule that costs follow the event. In the United 
States this is, of course, different. See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 17. Brian R. Cheffins, Reforming the Derivative Action: The Canadian Experience 
and British Prospects, 2 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 227, 257 (1997). 
 18. Id. at 257–58. 
 19. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 347–48. The pattern of 
derivative litigation can be explained in large measure by the incentive structure which 
exists for lawyers in the United States. Id. at 348 n.13. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The 
Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 85 (1991); 
Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 
366–67 (2001); Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insur-
ance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1157 (1990); Deborah DeMott, Shareholder Litigation 
in Australia and the United States: Common Problems, Uncommon Solutions, 11 SYDNEY 
L. REV. 259, 273 (1987). These themes and sources are explored in Reisberg, Funding 
Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 348, 348 n.13. For further information on the com-
mon fund doctrine, see id. at 349 n.20. 
According to the doctrine, when a fund is recovered which benefits a class of 
persons beyond the nominal plaintiff, the legal fees expended in recovery are 
treated as a first charge against the fund. The theory of the doctrine is based on 
unjust enrichment and demands that all beneficiaries contribute pro rata to the 
expense of recovery. In the early application of the doctrine a monetary fund 
had to be recovered or saved. The shortcomings of the restrictive application 
became obvious when injunctive or declaratory relief was sought as there was 
no fund to charge. This deficiency was cured by judicial innovation, which ex-
tended the doctrine to situations where a substantial, although not monetary, 
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As a result of the well-built fee structure in the [United States], it is 
common to see attorneys functioning more like “entrepreneurs” who 
conduct litigation almost entirely on their own, with virtually no moni-
toring by the shareholders whose names are used only as the key to the 
courtroom door. . . . The contingency fees arrangement and the lodestar 
method are perhaps the two most important mechanisms that affect not 
only who pays the attorneys’ fees and how these fees are calculated, but 
also how the plaintiffs’ attorneys conduct the derivative action litiga-
tion. Not surprisingly, win or lose, derivative actions appear to be fairly 
common in the [United States.] 20 
English law’s dearth of similar doctrines to derivative actions may ex-
plain their underutilization.21 Indeed, “the traditional way in which most 
                                                                                                  
benefit was obtained, justifying an award of attorneys’ fees against the benefit-
ing entity. 
Id. (citing Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 169 (1939); Lang Thai, How 
Popular are Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia? Comparisons with United States, 
Canada and New Zealand, 30 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 118, 123 n.48 (2002) (citing P.A. 
Batista, Counsel Fees in Derivative Litigation: End of the Golden Harvest?, 11 SEC. REG. 
L.J. 153 (1983); Carol G. Hammett, Attorney’s Fees in Shareholder Derivative Suits: The 
Substantial Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60 CAL. L. REV. 164, 164–65 (1972); AM. L. INST. 
[A.L.I.], PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17 
cmts. a & c (Proposed Final Draft 1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORP. 
GOVERNANCE]). For further information on the substantial benefit doctrine, see Reisberg, 
Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 350. 
Based on these approaches, there are two methods for calculating attorneys’ 
fees in derivative actions. The first method is the percentage scale, which is ap-
plicable when the case generates a common fund for the company—the attor-
ney will then be paid in the range of 20–30% of the common fund, depending 
on the prior agreement. Stated differently, a percentage scale will be used to 
calculate attorneys’ fees if derivative action results in a tangible monetary re-
lief. In a case where derivative litigation results in an intangible or therapeutic 
relief only, the courts will apply the alternative method, known as the “lodestar 
method”, to allow attorneys to be paid for their work. The lodestar method is 
applicable if the derivative action results in a substantial benefit to the com-
pany, whether by judgment or settlement. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 20. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 350 (internal citations 
omitted); see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877, 885 (1987); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff’s At-
torney Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recom-
mendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991). 
 21. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 348. Of course this is not 
the whole picture. There are other reasons, including standing and policy issues. See id. at 
354–64.  
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Commonwealth jurisdictions address the obstacle of funding in a deriva-
tive action is by recognizing that the plaintiff should be indemnified for 
costs incurred in the proceeding, usually by allowing the court discretion 
on this matter.22 A major obstacle to derivative action is eliminated by 
compensating the shareholder’s costs.  In fact, “the possibility of award-
ing a cost indemnity order is a ‘significant incentive’ to use the deriva-
tive action.”23 However, as I have explained elsewhere, these arguments 
are flawed and “ignore the realities of derivative action litigation.”24 
Careful inspection of the operation of indemnity costs orders reveals sig-
nificant failings in the operation of these orders.25 Thus, “it is a less than 
adequate response to the formidable funding problem inherent in deriva-
tive actions.”26 The common law position on costs of derivative claims 
has not changed.27 It follows that the practicalities of financing share-
                                                                                                  
In addition, in the UK, market forces can be quite potent. It is widely acknowl-
edged that the UK has a more robust and less regulated takeover market than 
the [United States], while the [United States] is more permissive towards de-
rivative litigation. Miller argues that these differences can be viewed as reflect-
ing alternative approaches to controlling “agency costs.” Geoffrey Miller, Po-
litical Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of Contrast between 
the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 52. Arguably, 
the differences also stem largely from the political influence of the organized 
bar. Because the English system until recently did not recognize any form of 
contingency fees, there is little support from the organized bar to push for liber-
alization in the rules governing derivative litigation. Thus incumbent managers, 
who are generally hostile to derivative litigation, exercise a great deal of con-
trol over the scope of the remedy. The recognition of contingency fees and the 
“common fund” doctrine . . . permitting attorney compensation out of the 
amounts generated for the benefit of the corporation have created a strong in-
terest group within the organized bar that favours a relatively liberal scope for 
the remedy. Because the organized bar is usually quite influential in the design 
of corporate rules, it has been able to ensure a relatively wide-ranging deriva-
tive remedy despite the remedy’s unpopularity among corporate managers. Id.; 
see also, John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The 
Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 1–3 (1999). 
Id. at 348 n.14 (adjusted for proper Bluebook form). 
 22. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 351. 
 23. Id. at 352 (citing D.D. Prentice, Wallersteiner v. Moir: The Demise of the Rule in 
Foss v Harbottle?, 40 CONV. & PROP. LAW. 51, 59 (1976)); LAW COMM’N, SHAREHOLDER 
REMEDIES (CONSULTATION), 1996, EWLC 142, ¶ 18.1 (U.K.) [hereinafter SHAREHOLDER 
REMEDIES CONSULTATION]. 
 24. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 352. 
 25. Id.; see REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5. 
 26. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 365. 
 27. Advance indemnities, along the lines of those supported in Wallersteiner v. Moir, 
[1975] Q.B. 373 (U.K.) and Civil Procedure Rules [CPR], 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, r. 
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holder litigation remains a major obstacle in the new procedure under 
Part 11 of the U.K. Companies Act 2006.28 
B. THE PROCEDURE UNDER ISRAELI LAW: VARIOUS 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE DERIVATIVE 
ACTIONS 
1. Background 
Under the Israeli Companies Law of 1999 (“Companies Law”), deriva-
tive action is defined as “an action brought by a plaintiff on behalf of a 
company for a wrong done to the company.”29 There are no express sec-
tions under the Companies Law as to the causes of action for which the 
derivative action is to be available. However, a prospective plaintiff has 
to seek leave to bring the action beyond the preliminary stages30 and the 
statute sets out the conditions that the court must determine are satisfied 
before leave can be given.31 
The Israeli derivative action is a descendant of the common law deriva-
tive action. [The derivative action mechanism was developed by the ju-
diciary, which followed and expanded the English doctrine on the mat-
ter.] Over the years, Israeli courts have generally shown a willingness 
to grant a shareholder standing where justice requires it, but unlike 
English courts, they have also shown an inclination to effectively 
“brush aside” the procedural barriers of Foss v. Harbottle where they 
stand in the way of justice being served. This attitude has continued in 
recent cases, with the most obvious point of contrast lying in the 
courts’ willingness to embrace the “interests of justice” as an exception 
to Foss v. Harbottle in its own right. This tendency culminated with the 
replacement of the existing derivative action procedure with a new one 
on a statutory footing as part of the third chapter of the Israeli Compa-
nies Law of 1999 that came into effect in February 2000.32 
                                                                                                  
19.9(7) (U.K.), where the company may reimburse the shareholder for bringing the action 
if the court grants leave to continue, will be difficult to obtain as the statutory reforms fail 
to induce the courts to rethink their cautious position here. 
 28. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 263(2)(a) (U.K.) [hereinafter Companies Act 
2006]; see also Reisberg, Derivative Claims, supra note 3; Arad Reisberg, Shadows of 
the Past and Back to the Future: Part 11 of the UK Companies Act 2006 (in)action, 6 
EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 219, 239 (2009). 
 29. Companies Law § 1. 
 30. Arad Reisberg, Promoting the Use of Derivative Action, 24 COMPANY LAW. 250, 
250 (2003) [hereinafter Reisberg, Derivative Action]; Companies Law § 194 (A). 
 31. Reisberg, Derivative Action, supra note 30, at 250; Companies Law § 198. 
 32. Reisberg, Derivative Action, supra note 30, at 250 (citing Foss v. Harbottle, 
(1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 2 Hare 461 (U.K.); Neve-Yam of Arsuf Beach Hotels Ltd. v. 
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One fundamental objective seems to underline the majority of sections 
in the statutory derivative action: encouraging or promoting the use of 
derivative actions.33 The sections are designed “to turn the derivative 
action into a beneficial tool in enforcing corporate accountability. The 
derivative action is made more widely accessible for prospective plain-
tiffs by mitigating the effect of distorted litigation incentives”34 and by 
limiting the financial liability plaintiffs face when initiating a derivative 
action. These include levying low court fees for derivative actions, grant-
ing the courts the right to award special dispensation to the filing share-
holder (i.e. the possibility of rewarding the plaintiff), and transferring the 
costs onto the company once the claim is approved as a derivative action 
by the court.35 Let us look at these more closely. 
2. Distributing the Burden of Court Fees36 
In spite of the tendency of Israeli courts to encourage the use of deriva-
tive actions, “[o]ne of the major obstacles still in the way of bringing 
derivative actions is that under Israeli law the plaintiff must carry the 
burden of the costs of proceeding, between the stage where he is granted 
permission to bring the action and its final conclusion in judgment.”37 
Israeli courts have upheld this view, finding that the plaintiff must meet 
the burden of court fees.38 
                                                                                                  
Cohen, 30 PD 517, 528–29 [1976] (Isr.); Gil v. Discount Bank Le-Israel Ltd., PM(2) 294 
[1988] (Isr.)). The doctrine of Foss v. Harbottle was well stated by Lord Davey in Bur-
land v. Earle (more clearly than in Foss itself) where he said: 
It is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that the 
Court will not interfere with the internal management of companies acting 
within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so. Again it is clear 
law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company, or to recover money 
or damages alleged to be due to the company, the action should prima facie be 
brought by the company itself. 
Burland v. Earle, [1902] A.C. 83 (P.C.) (U.K.). 
 33. Reisberg, Derivative Action, supra note 30, at 250; IRIT HAVIV-SEGAL, 
CORPORATE LAW IN ISRAEL, AFTER THE NEW COMPANIES ACT 605 (1999) (Isr.). 
 34. Reisberg, Derivative Action, supra note 30, at 250. 
 35. See id. (for a fuller account). The fact that the costs of derivative actions are to be 
met by the company, and are not linked to the success of the case, provides more cer-
tainty to prospective plaintiffs. 
 36. Court fees are levy paid directly to court upon bringing any action before Israeli 
courts. They are set in regulations and their rate is reviewed regularly. 
 37. Reisberg, Derivative Action, supra note 30, at 251; HAVIV-SEGAL, supra note 33, 
at 606. 
 38. Y.A.Z Investments v. Zelinger, Tak-Al, 97(2) PD 550 (Civil Appeal Request 
1470/97) (Isr.). 
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The Companies Law tackles this head on. Section 199(1) states that 
when the court has granted leave to bring a derivative action, the court 
may give instructions as to the manner and dates of payment of court 
fees—including the division of payment between the plaintiff and the 
company. Arguably, this may serve to alleviate some of the plaintiffs’ 
pressures (provided, of course, the court follows the spirit of this provi-
sion). In addition, and as an exception under the Israeli legal system, 
court fees do no need to be paid at the same time as the application to 
leave is submitted. Another positive measure towards potential plaintiffs 
is that when leave is not granted by the court to bring a derivative action 
or leave is granted with changes and the plaintiff has withdrawn his case, 
no court fees will be paid as well. Not to be deterred by high litigation 
costs, plaintiffs have nothing to lose or pay from their own pockets for 
bearing the risk of bringing the action.39 
3. Covering for Plaintiff’s Expenses during the Legal Proceedings 
The arrangements under Sections 199(1) and 199(2) provide the court 
discretion to relieve the burden of expenses even at this early stage of 
proceeding. Under Section 199(2), when the court has granted leave to 
bring a derivative action, the court can already “order the company to 
pay the plaintiff such sums as it may prescribe to cover the plaintiff’s 
costs or to deposit a security for such payment.”40 The court has discre-
tion to distinguish between cases brought because the company is im-
properly prevented from averting or remedying a self-interested board’s 
wrong or by majority shareholders acting improperly, and frivolous cases 
that are brought by vexatious litigants.41 Indeed, Section 200 provides 
that once the court has reached a decision on the derivative action, it 
may, amongst other options, order the plaintiff to pay the company’s ex-
penses—part or all—according to the circumstances. Therefore, in cases 
where the court has shifted the burden of costs onto the company at an 
early stage of proceedings, it may still decide to return that burden to the 
plaintiff if it feels there was no justification for bringing the action retro-
spectively.42 
In order to encourage derivative actions, a number of modifications 
were made in the context of the Companies Law. Only a part of the court 
fee (not the full fee) is paid at the time that a derivative action is filed. 
“Regulations stipulate that when a petition for the approval of a deriva-
                                                                                                  
 39. Reisberg, Derivative Action, supra note 30, at 251–52. 
 40. Companies Law § 199(2). 
 41. HAVIV-SEGAL, supra note 33, at 606. 
 42. Id. at 607. 
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tive action is filed, the petitioner will pay a petition fee of NIS 2000.” 43 
The rest of the fee will be paid only if the petition is granted, and then by 
the company itself. As ISA helpfully explains, “this removes an obstacle 
that had blocked shareholders in the past—shareholders who refrained 
from filing derivative actions because of the high court fee that they were 
required to pay upon filing the petition.”44 
4. Costs of Derivative Actions Are to Be Met by the Company and Are 
Not Linked to the Success of the Case 
4.1 General 
Section 200 provides that “where the court has adjudicated on a deriva-
tive action, it may require the company to pay the plaintiff’s costs and it 
may require the plaintiff to pay costs incurred by the company, in whole 
or in part, taking into account the judgment and the other circumstances 
of the case.”45 
It is clear then, that the court’s discretion to order the company to meet 
the costs of proceedings is not limited to situations where the action was 
successful, and the court may order the company to meet the costs of 
proceeding when appropriate, even if the case eventually failed. Essen-
tially, this recognizes the fact that the proceedings are those of the com-
pany. In this context, perhaps a better inquiry is whether the decision to 
bring the action was justified in the first place, not whether it was ulti-
mately successful.46 Nevertheless, the words of the Act (“taking into ac-
count the judgment and other relevant circumstances”)47 do suggest that 
there is still some importance placed on the success of the case.48 An-
                                                                                                  
 43. ISRAEL SEC. AUTH. [ISA], ISRAEL SELF ASSESSMENT ACCORDING TO 
METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OECD PRINCIPLES ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS PART OF PROCESS OF ACCESSION TO THE OECD 22 (Dec. 
2008) [hereinafter ISA, SELF ASSESSMENT], available at 
http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_4544.pdf. At exchange rates as of September 30, 
2011, this is roughly around $540. 
 44. Id. at 22. 
 45. Companies Law § 200. 
 46. HAVIV-SEGAL, supra note 33, at 607. 
 47. Companies Law § 200. 
 48. Compare the test formulated by Lord Denning in Wallersteiner v. Moir that even 
if the action fails, 
assuming that the minority shareholder had reasonable ground for bringing the 
action—that it was a reasonable and prudent course to take in the interests of 
the company—he should not himself be liable to pay the costs of the other side, 
but the company itself should be liable, because he was acting for it and not for 
himself. 
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other possible test to determine whether the plaintiff should be entitled to 
be indemnified by the company against all costs and expenses reasonably 
incurred by him in the course of the proceedings is “whether an inde-
pendent board of directors would have decided to bring the action.”49 
There is no doubt that Section 200 is potentially one of the most im-
portant sections for prospective plaintiffs, as it mitigates the effect of 
distorted litigation incentives. With regard to a derivative claim as well, 
Section 201 of the Companies Law provides that in the event of a favor-
able ruling in the claim, the court may order the payment of compensa-
tion to the plaintiff for the effort invested in filing the petition and prov-
ing it.50 Section 200 also provides that when a court has awarded ex-
penses in favor of the defendant, the company will pay the expenses that 
have been so awarded, unless the court rules, for special reasons which 
shall be recorded, that the expenses are to be paid by the plaintiff. 
4.2 Addressing the Issue of Attorney’s Fees Specifically 
Section 200 deals with costs51 generally, but there is little guidance to 
the court with regard to attorney’s fees. However, a recent amendment to 
the Companies Law, namely Section 200A, has expressively dealt with 
this issue. Amendment No. 3 to the Companies Law provides that the 
fees of the plaintiff’s attorney in a derivative action will be set by the 
court and paid by the company unless the court decides for special rea-
sons that the plaintiff should pay its attorney’s fees.52 
It should be noted that the Section uses the words “will be set by the 
court,” which imply that this is a mandatory obligation. Interestingly, the 
official explanation to the Amendment provides great insight into the 
reasoning behind the terms. According to the document, the arrange-
ments are similar to those in the United States and are geared toward en-
couraging potential plaintiffs to use the tool of the derivative action.53 
Essentially, it is submitted—this aligns with the fact that the proceedings 
are brought on behalf of the company. More importantly, although Sec-
tion 200 provides that once the court has reached a judgment on the de-
rivative action the court may order the company to meet the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                  
Wallersteiner v. Moir, [1975] Q.B. 373 (U.K.). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Companies Law § 201. 
 51. In English law the term “costs” includes lawyer’s fees, whereas in Israel the term 
refers to the required disbursements in bringing action, i.e. filing fees. It is useful then, in 
order to avoid confusion, to use the term “fees” when discussing the payment due to law-
yers. 
 52. See Companies Law § 44 (amend. 3), 2005. 
 53. See Companies Bill (amend.), 2002, at 646 & § 34 (explanatory notes) (Isr.). 
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costs, this may not be enough, as in many cases the costs granted are not 
sufficient (so that it may not cover, in actual terms, for all the attorney’s 
fees).54 Likewise, leaving the issue of attorney’s fees unarranged may 
deter potential plaintiffs from bringing derivative actions for fear that 
they will have to meet the burden of attorney’s fees themselves. Unde-
termined payment may also deter potential attorneys from taking on the 
representation for fear that the fee agreements between themselves and 
the plaintiff will not be respected by the company.55 The lack of plaintiff-
favoring fee rules in derivative actions generally limits the use of such 
actions, for the potential gain to the nominal shareholder plaintiff will 
almost always be outweighed by the potential liability for legal fees, with 
the result that the expected value of litigation will normally be negative. 
If a procedure could be devised to compensate a shareholder by ordering 
the company to pay the attorney his fees, then a formidable deterrent to 
the commencing of derivative action would be removed. The effect of 
Section 200 may reduce the personal risk faced by potential plaintiffs. 
Again, in terms of policy objective, this underlines the fact that deriva-
tive actions efficiently enforce corporate duties and obligations, and such 
actions would not be pursued by rational plaintiffs absent adequate fee 
incentives.56 However, as I have explained elsewhere, this only reduces, 
rather than eliminates, the deterrent effect of fees in litigation.57 Under 
Section 200, the plaintiff must prevail for the court to order the company 
to pay the attorney his fees.58 If the action is unsuccessful, the plaintiff 
still remains liable for lawyer’s fees. This may be mitigated if the court 
uses its discretion and orders the company to meet the costs of proceed-
ings in case the action was unsuccessful. 
5. The Possibility of Rewarding the Plaintiff 
Section 201 provides that “where the court rules in favor of the com-
pany, it may order the payment of a reward to the plaintiff taking into 
account, inter alia, the benefit derived by the company from filing the 
claim and from winning it.”59 The court therefore has the discretion to 
increase the share of the plaintiff in the proceeds of the successful action 
beyond his indirect recovery (to the extent that recovery has any actual 
impact on the value of his shares because of the success of the case). 
                                                                                                  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Compare the U.S. decision in Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 
1957). 
 57. See Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 351. 
 58. Compare with the English indemnity costs orders, see supra Section B.4. 
 59. Companies Law § 201. 
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This has been described as a “major revolution” as it reflects the policy 
of the new Act to encourage shareholders and directors to inform the 
court of management irregularities by means of derivative actions.60 In 
large companies, where the average holdings of shareholders is rather 
small, meeting the costs of bringing the action by the company may not 
be enough to encourage potential plaintiffs to initiate derivative action. 
In these types of companies an additional incentive, such as receiving 
part of the proceeds of a successful action, may be needed. The absence 
of such a direct reward prior to the Companies Law of 1999 has been 
offered as a possible explanation of the small number of derivative ac-
tions brought in Israel in the past.61 
Essentially, the Section deals directly with a fundamental obstacle in-
herent in derivative litigation. An indemnity order in favor of the plaintiff 
out of company funds is usually ordered once a derivative action is 
brought. It presupposes that a shareholder would want to bring the action 
on behalf of the company. However, it fails to promote or give any in-
centive for a shareholder to commence litigation in the first place.62 
First, there is the expense of litigation and the prospect that the share-
holder may have to pay the legal expenses of the defendant if the action 
is unsuccessful. . . . Second, even if the litigation is successful, any 
damages recovered accrue to the company . . . and not just to the share-
holder bringing the action. Because the plaintiff shareholder will there-
fore receive only a pro rata share of the gains of a successful action 
(and then only indirectly and only to the extent the proceedings cause 
the value of his own share to rise) the fact that other shareholders will 
“free-ride” on the plaintiff shareholder’s action creates a disincentive to 
commence litigation.63 
This sort of free-riding effect has a strong incentive for any prospective 
plaintiff to leave it to someone else to sue. However, “if all shareholders 
share the same view, no one is likely to step forward even in situations 
where litigation would increase total share value.”64 Section 201 tackles 
this issue by making it possible for the court to award successful plain-
tiffs with partial proceeds of a successful action beyond their indirect 
recovery. In effect then, the plaintiff can benefit directly in monetary 
terms, which in turn may make the remedy more worthwhile in the eyes 
                                                                                                  
 60. HAVIV-SEGAL, supra note 33, at 609. 
 61. Y. GROSS, ON THE NEW COMPANIES ACT, 1999, at 224 (2000) (Isr.). But see infra 
Section D.2.2.3.1. 
 62. On the difference between removing a deterrent and providing an incentive see 
REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 232–34. 
 63. Ramsay, supra note 14, at 163. 
 64. Cheffins, supra note 17. 
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of prospective plaintiffs. It has been suggested that the policy considera-
tions guiding the court in determining the extent of the reward should 
include the severity and the extent of the abuse or infringement. The 
more severe the abuse or infringement, the higher the personal reward for 
the plaintiff should be.65 
6. Resolving a Commercial Dispute through the Israeli Courts 
Finally, and before we turn to examine the new Amendment in the fol-
lowing Section, it is perhaps worth putting the Israeli system in a wider 
context in terms of the quantifiable cost, time, and procedures usually 
expected to resolve a commercial dispute (such as through a derivative 
action) through the Israeli courts. As can be seen below under Figure 1, 
the Israeli system does not compare favorably with the OECD average. 
According to Enforcing Contracts66 published by the World Bank,67 there 
are 35 procedures in an average commercial trial (compared with 31 at 
the OECD), it lasts on average 890 days (just more than 500 days at the 
OECD), and it costs 25.3% of the claim to resolve a commercial dispute 
through the Israeli courts (19% at the OECD).  
 
(See graphs on next page.) 
 
                                                                                                  
 65. HAVIV-SEGAL, supra note 33, at 608. 
 66. This is a slightly misleading title which measures three things: (1) number of 
procedures to enforce a contract, i.e. any interaction between the parties in a commercial 
dispute or between them and the judge or court officer, steps to file the case, steps for 
trial and judgment, as well asd steps to enforce the judgment; (2) time required to com-
plete procedures (calendar days), i.e. time to file and serve the case, time for trial and 
obtaining judgment and time to enforce the judgment; and (3) cost required to complete 
procedures i.e. average attorney fees, court costs, including expert fees and enforcement 
costs. See Doing Business: Enforcing Contracts in Israel, WORLD BANK (2011), 
www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/Israel/enforcing-contracts [hereinafter 
Doing Business Report]. 
 67. Id. 
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Figure 1: Enforcing Contracts Subindicators in Israel 68   
 2007–2010 
  
 
 
                                                                                                  
 68. Id. 
1038 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:3 
 
C. PUBLIC FUNDING OF DERIVATIVE CLAIMS UNDER ISRAELI LAW 
1. Background: The Possibility of ISA Funding for Derivative Actions 
ISA69 announced in 2005 that it would, in principle, be prepared to 
provide funding for derivative actions in cases it believes are “of general 
importance to the public.”70 In line with this approach, Amendment 16 to 
the Companies Law was introduced in May 2011.71  In theory, the 
amendment was designed to encourage derivative actions by limiting the 
financial liability plaintiffs face when initiating such an action. A new 
Section 205 has been inserted into the Companies Law, which states as 
follows: 
(a) Any plaintiff, who wishes to bring a derivative action in the name of 
a public company or a private company, and who meets the criteria un-
der section 171(a), is allowed to request the Israel Securities Authority 
to bear his costs. 
(b) If the Israel Securities Authority is convinced there is a public inter-
est in bringing the case and there is a reasonable prospect the court 
would grant leave for the action to continue as a derivative action, the 
Authority may bear the plaintiff’s costs, on such sums and conditions 
as it thinks fit; the Authority’s decisions according to this section can-
not be used as an evidence and it is not possible to submit them before 
the court. 
(c) If the court decided in favour of the company, the court may in its 
judgment provide for the company to reimburse the Israel Securities 
Authority for its expenses.72 
Section 205A makes it clear then that in order for funding to be carried 
out by ISA, ISA needs to be convinced that two cumulative conditions 
                                                                                                  
 69. The Israel Securities Authority (“ISA”) is an independent regulatory body, estab-
lished under the Securities Law of 1968, whose members are appointed by the Minister 
of Finance. Its mandate is to protect the interests of the investing public. ISA has a wide 
range of responsibilities and powers. ISA in a Nutshell, ISA, 
http://www.isa.gov.il/Default.aspx?Site=english (last visited May 8, 2012) (for a view of 
the areas and issues ISA is in charge of). ISA is the Israeli equivalent of the SEC. See infra 
notes 164–73 and accompanying text. 
 70. See GLOBES, ISRAEL BUSINESS CONFERENCE 2005 REPORT: ANALYSIS SECTION 
(Dec. 3–5, 2005) (Isr.). 
 71. First, in Companies Law of 1999 Draft Bill (amend. no. 12) (Corporate Govern-
ance Efficiency) (Mar. 10, 2010), which subsequently became Companies Act (amend. 
no. 16), 2011 (effective May 2011) (Isr.). 
 72. Companies Law § 205(a)–(c). 
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are met: (1) there is a public interest in bringing the case 73 and (2) there 
is a reasonable prospect the court would grant leave for the action to con-
tinue as a derivative action. The rationale for this Section is explained in 
the following terms: 
[T]he cost of funding the lawsuit may deter derivative actions from be-
ing brought, and so, in order to incentivise the plaintiff, it is proposed 
to introduce a similar arrangement which exists for class actions (under 
section 209 of the Companies Law).74 
Interestingly, the Explanatory Notes to Amendment 16 add two impor-
tant points.75 First, the plaintiff in derivative actions, in addition to bene-
fiting himself (and like the position in class actions cases), benefits all 
other shareholders who are similarly positioned. Secondly, this Amend-
ment “would strengthen enforcement in the financial markets.”76 
At first blush, this appears like a positive step forward in terms of ef-
fective corporate governance. If funding can be provided (by whatever 
source, even public), then this should be welcomed on the basis that it 
addresses the incentives problem inherent in derivative action litigation. 
Indeed, this amendment should be seen in its wider context—it was one 
of three amendments relating to derivative actions introduced as part of 
Amendment 16 under which the Israeli legislature sought, yet again,77 to 
encourage and stimulate the use of derivative actions.78 Nonetheless, the 
                                                                                                  
 73. On the public character of derivative claims see REISBERG, THEORY AND 
OPERATION, supra note 5, at 68–71. 
 74. Companies Act, (amend. no. 16), § 19 (explanatory notes) 2011. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. In an earlier draft of this Amendment it was stated that the derivative claim 
has a central role in enforcing the company’s right, including enforcing directors’ duties. 
It was expected the funding would be given for the application at the leave stage includ-
ing covering expert and legal opinions as well as any costs that are likely to be incurred 
in case the court should refuse leave. See Companies Law, (amend. no. 10) para. 12 (May 
2008) (Isr.). 
 77. Recall that, as we saw in Section C above, there were previously a number of 
amendments brought forward after the Companies Law of 1999 came into force in 2000 
as the volume of derivative action litigation was perceived to be low. 
 78. The two additional reforms in favor of the plaintiff are as follows: first, under 
Section 194 the plaintiff is no longer required to make a demand first on the board before 
filing the suit, if the board (or most of the individuals comprising the board) have a per-
sonal interest in the lawsuit or are subject to the lawsuit or a disclosure to the board may 
damage the relief sought by the plaintiff. The applicant filing a derivative action can skip 
over this hurdle and submit the claim directly to court. Secondly, under Section 198A, an 
applicant filing a derivative action may now ask the court to order the company to reveal 
documents relating to the leave to proceed of the derivative claim. Such a request would 
be approved if the court is persuaded that the applicant has provided an initial evidentiary 
basis for the claim. It appears that this addition is introduced on the basis that this is not a 
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ramifications of new Section 205A require further thought. There are at 
least two discrete issues present. First, the details of the Section itself 
need to be examined. As part of this inquiry, one must look more closely 
at the rationales offered by the new amendment, namely, will the new 
rule indeed benefit all other shareholders who are similarly positioned, 
and would it strengthen enforcement in the financial markets. Secondly, 
one may wonder whether it is indeed necessarily the case that the plain-
tiff in derivative actions is in exactly the same position as in class actions 
cases. Indeed, as will be seen below, this is questionable. 
2. An Analysis of the Details of Section 205A 
This Section will first deal with the practicalities of the Section itself. 
Recall that ISA needs to be convinced that two conditions are met: (1) 
that there is a public interest in bringing the case; and (2) that there is a 
reasonable prospect the court would grant leave for the action to continue 
as a derivative action. Let us first deal with the latter. 
2.1 There is a Reasonable Prospect That the Court Would Grant Leave 
for the Action to Continue as a Derivative Action 
The second condition for deciding whether a derivative action should 
be allowed to proceed is spelled out in a similar fashion to other various 
derivative action legislations.79 There is nothing novel about this. Indeed, 
it is reasonably clear what this will entail.80 To take a recent example 
from the U.K., Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd81 usefully noted some of 
the factors which a director, acting in accordance with Section 172 of the 
U.K. Companies Act 2006 (which is what the court is directed to con-
sider) would take into account in reaching his or her decision whether to 
allow a derivative claim to proceed: 
                                                                                                  
personal action, and as such, the shareholder plaintiff may not be in possession of all the 
material he needs in order to be able to establish an exhaustive and substantive claim. On 
the problem of access to information and discovery in derivative actions, see REISBERG, 
THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 85–87, 216–19 (“In derivative action litigation 
there is an added concern. Information asymmetries accompany managerial misconduct: 
directors know the frequency and amount of harm caused by their misconduct, whereas 
shareholders do not.”). 
 79. See, e.g., New Zealand Companies Act 1993, § 165(1)(b) (N.Z.) (“the likelihood 
of the proceeding succeeding”); see also Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 263(2)(a) (U.K.) 
(“Permission (or leave) must be refused if the court is satisfied—(a) that a person acting 
in accordance with Section 172 (duty to promote the success of the company) would not 
seek to continue the claim.”). 
 80. Companies Law § 263(2)(a) (referencing exemption and indemnification decision 
by directors). 
 81. Ienesi v. Westrip Holdings Ltd., [2009] EWHC (Ch) 2526 (Eng.). 
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They include: the size of the claim; the strength of the claim; the cost of 
the proceedings; the company’s ability to fund the proceedings; the 
ability of the potential defendants to satisfy a judgment; the impact on 
the company if it lost the claim and had to pay not only its own costs 
but the defendant’s as well; any disruption to the company’s activities 
while the claim is pursued; whether the prosecution of the claim would 
damage the company in other ways (e.g. by losing the services of a 
valuable employee or alienating a key supplier or customer) and so on. 
The weighing of all these considerations is essentially a commercial 
decision, which the court is ill-equipped to take, except in a clear 
case.82 
So far, so good. But the crucial question here is altogether different—
whereas judicial oversight in deciding such factors is commonplace (i.e. 
in virtually all jurisdictions in which the derivative action has been put 
on a statutory footing the court is entrusted with this task),83 and noncon-
troversial, it is ISA which is asked to conduct this assessment (in all like-
lihood before applying to the court) in addition to the court. Leaving 
aside the issue of duplication (discussed below), the question is how well 
can ISA perform the specific task of evaluating the potential success of 
litigation? Are ISA’s officials qualified to conduct such a task? Whereas 
ISA has some experience and expertise in evaluating the potential suc-
cess of litigation in the area of class action,84 it is by no means on the 
scale or comes as “natural” as for the court. Courts have a lengthy history 
of determining cases involving breaches of duty and have developed 
considerable expertise and knowledge in this area.85 “[T]o the extent that 
the determination hinges on an appraisal of the merits of the litigation, it 
has been suggested that the court’s perspective and expertise are superior 
to the boards.”86 There is no reason why an independent expert may not, 
in appropriate cases, be allowed to investigate and advise ISA on the ac-
tion87 (naturally this requires allocating further financial resources too), 
                                                                                                  
 82. Ienesi, EWHC (Ch) at [85]. 
 83. Jurisdictions including: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and South 
Africa, to name a few. 
 84. See infra C.3. 
 85. See REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 232–41. 
 86. Ramsay, supra note 14, at 173–74; see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, 
The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Re-
form, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 282–83 (1981). 
 87. The South African legislature provides, in the limited context of the statutory 
derivative action, a first step for the appointment by the court of a curator ad litem, 
whose role is to investigate the shareholder’s complaint and advise the court whether the 
litigation should be allowed to proceed. Companies Act 61 of 1973 § 266 (S. Afr.). The 
curator is given unrestricted access to the company’s books and records. Likewise in 
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which in turn may provide ISA with arguably better and more neutral 
information than either a resolution in a shareholders’ meeting or the 
views of an allegedly biased board. Nonetheless, and although ISA’s ex-
pertise can gradually develop over time, there is an inescapable problem 
here. Whereas the court’s role in assessing this question is unquestiona-
bly unbiased (in the sense that it is not party to the litigation), ISA’s posi-
tion here is more akin to that of a party to the litigation rather than an 
independent adjudicator.88 Once it decides to support a case by giving it a 
“stamp of approval” in the form of financial support, it is inevitably a 
party to the litigation regardless of the fact that ISA’s decision to support 
the case cannot be used as evidence and it is not possible to submit it be-
fore the court. 
2.2. Is There a Public Interest in Bringing the Case? 
The Paper now turns to the first condition under Section 205A in order 
for funding to be carried out by ISA, namely, that there is a public inter-
est in bringing the case. The discussion about this element needs to be 
broken down into a number of avenues of inquiry. These are explored in 
detail next. 
2.2.1 Litigation is a Public Good 
The argument that derivative actions solve a collective action problem 
rests on the premise that, very much like the class action mechanism,89 
the device enables the creation of a good that would not otherwise be 
produced, namely, a lawsuit. In other words, litigation can be conceptu-
alized as a public good as “its pursuit produces positive externalities, and 
litigants in group-like situations therefore have incentives to free ride.”90 
But Rubenstein rightly asks: 
 
                                                                                                  
Section 247(A) of the Australian Corporations Law, the court, on application by a share-
holder “acting in good faith and for a proper purpose,” is authorized to order that the 
applicant be allowed to inspect the company’s records, not personally, but through a law-
yer or registered company auditor acting on his behalf, on such terms as the court thinks 
fit. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 247(A) (Austl.). 
 88. Indeed, recall that Section 209 provides that if the court decided in favor of the 
company, the court may in its judgment provide for the company to reimburse ISA for its 
expenses. Companies Law § 209(c). This is very similar to the arrangement under Sec-
tion 200, supra Section B.4, under which the court may order the company to meet the 
plaintiff’s costs. Companies Law § 200. 
 89. William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory 
of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 709 n.5 (2006). 
 90. See id. at 720–28. 
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[w]hat are the positive externalities that flow from individual litiga-
tion? Most generally, as Judge Posner explains, litigation “establishes 
rules of conduct designed to shape future conduct, not only the pre-
sent disputants’ but also other people’s.” These “rules of con-
duct” constitute goods with the attributes of public goods: the rules of 
conduct are not diminished when used and no individual can be ex-
cluded from using them. More specifically, the positive externalities 
of individual lawsuits can be grouped into four sets of effects: 1) de-
cree effects; 2) settlement effects; 3) threat effects; and 4) institutional 
effects.91 
First, one must look at decree effects. This is based on the assumption 
that the legal principle developed in a particular case will generate 
more certainty in shaping social behavior and, at the same time, lower 
the need for future adjudication regarding the decided matter.92 It fol-
lows that a potential social benefit from derivative action litigation is 
solely supplementary to its role as a governance mechanism: legal rules 
are public goods.93 In theory then, litigation can reduce legal uncertainty. 
As Kamar explains, the absence of clear legal rules is costly.94 First, it 
leads to variance in valuations of the legal standard and therefore to di-
vergences of behavior from what is perceived to be the social optimum.95 
This may result in corporate fiduciaries overestimating the legal con-
straints and forgoing efficient transactions, while other fiduciaries may 
undervalue the very same restrictions and carry out inefficient transac-
tions. Second, legal indeterminacy produces liability risk that risk-averse 
fiduciaries are in a somewhat poor position to bear. This is because ex-
posing corporate fiduciaries to this risk results in their services being 
more costly and less productive to shareholders. 96 
                                                                                                  
 91. Id. at 723 (citations omitted) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 530–31 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing social benefits of litigation beyond dispute 
resolution); see also Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
937, 938 (1975) (describing a “behavior modification model” of litigation in which “[n]ot 
the resolution of the immediate dispute but its effect on the future conduct of others is the 
heart of the matter”). 
 92. Id.; see also HAZEL GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE 74 (2010) (“an elaborated, 
granular body of rules in a common law system offers guidance on how to ascertain legal 
risk”). 
 93. See Romano, supra note 19; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34–35 (1991). 
 94. Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 887, 888–89 (1999). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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The decree effects have a number of positive externalities. First, 
there is a general legal effect: if future litigation does arise, the decree 
from the initial case will serve as stare decisis, hence making resolution 
of later cases more efficient. Second, the decree in the initial case could 
also be used to preclude relitigation of factual matters in future cases 
among the same or similarly situated litigants. Finally, the decree may 
necessitate a party to stop a practice affecting a wider group of indi-
viduals (that is in spite of the fact that the initial case was prosecuted by 
only one of them). In short, a particular a lawsuit that generates a judicial 
decision has therefore produced noteworthy social benefits in terms of 
forming conduct, lessening litigation costs, and conserving judicial 
resources.97 
Second, individual lawsuits resulting in settlements,98 may never-
theless produce analogous positive externalities as “settlement effects.” 
“If one litigant successfully challenges a policy that affects many per-
sons, a defendant may agree to change its behavior as to the entire 
class.”99 For example, in Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, Inc.,100 a deriva-
tive action had been settled by certain agreements regarding the fu-
ture conduct of corporate affairs, and the court held that the settlement 
had resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation and therefore 
that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees despite the 
fact that no fund was produced.101 
It should be highlighted that even if a defendant does not subscribe 
as a formal matter to alter its general policy as a result of the initial 
case, it may nevertheless do so informally lest it be faced with re-
peated lawsuits. This may be the case if a group of plaintiffs is 
closely related to one another or share legal counsel—in such a case, 
information about the initial settlement can easily be spread among 
similarly situated parties, who can then use it to their benefit. And vice 
versa: shared information about a weak settlement may dissuade liti-
gation. In the same way, settlements by some defendants within the 
same industry could boost other defendant/competitors to opt for settling 
                                                                                                  
 97. Rubenstein, supra note 89, at 723–24. This is one of the primary reasons that 
Professor Fiss opposes settlement. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1085 (1984). Indeed, it is not necessarily true that an unsatisfactory settlement is better than 
the best trial. “Trials reduce disputes and it is profound mistake to view a trial as a failure 
of the civil justice system.” Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial 
Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1421 (2002); see also GENN, supra note 92, at 74. 
 98. After all, the vast majority of civil cases are settled. See, e.g., GENN, supra note 
92, at 21. 
 99. Rubenstein, supra note 89, at 724. 
 100. Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968). 
 101. Id. 
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their case. In short, settlements, as well as judicial decrees, produce three 
major positive externalities: they alter behavior beyond the initial par-
ties, diminish future litigation costs with settlement range determina-
tions, and maintain judicial resources.102 
In the context of derivative actions, there is yet another strength in the 
settlement process that enables the derivative action to confer a public 
good. As seen earlier, because of his small stake in the company, the pro-
testing shareholder has very little incentive to reflect on the gravity of the 
action on the company.103 Therefore, derivative actions generate a risk of 
strategic behavior by minority shareholders. They open the “possibility 
for ‘gold-digging’ claims,”104 meaning that the plaintiff shareholder and 
defendants pursue their own advantages while likely ignoring those in-
terests of the company. To reduce the possibility of such claims, for ex-
ample, under English law, an order for an indemnity in respect to costs 
awarded to a shareholder also requires court approval for any offer of 
settlement of the action.105 “This procedure is analogous to that in the 
United States106 and Israeli107 systems for class and derivative actions, 
which does not otherwise exist in the procedure under English law.”108 
Control of settlements by the courts therefore produces a public good by 
guarding against abuse.109 
                                                                                                  
 102. Rubenstein, supra note 89, at 724. 
Unlike traditional litigation, remarkably few of the [derivative] suits in my 
study ended with monetary payments. Instead, these suits more commonly 
ended with corporations agreeing to reform their own corporate governance 
practices, from the number of independent directors on their boards to the 
method by which they compensate their top executives. These settlements re-
flect the rise of a new type of shareholder activism, one that has gone undocu-
mented in the legal literature. 
Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1749 (2010). 
 103. Wilson, supra note 7, at 179–80. 
 104. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 354. 
 105. CPR 19.9(3) (U.K.). 
 106. Rule 23.1(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] derivative 
action may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(1)(c). 
 107. Section 202 provides that “A plaintiff shall not withdraw a derivative action, and 
shall not enter into an arrangement or settlement with the defendant, other than with the 
consent of the court; the application for such consent specify all details of the arrange-
ment or settlement, including any payment offered to the plaintiff.” Companies Law § 
202. 
 108. Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions, supra note 2, at 354. 
 109. See REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 68–69. 
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Third, “the very threat of individual litigation, absent settlement or 
decree, may also produce positive social benefits”110 in the form of en-
hanced deterrence.111 The argument for a deterrence rationale relies on a 
likely unknowable variable: gains to shareholders resulting from future 
deterred misconduct.112 Although these gains cannot be quantified relia-
bly, it is easy to understate them. This is partly because a successful de-
rivative action likely spurs a positive externality: deterrence of miscon-
duct in other companies.113 As a result, even if the deterrent benefits to 
the company in whose name the action is brought do not exceed the 
company’s direct and indirect litigation costs, its shareholders still may 
benefit.114 In addition, arguably, a credible threat of an action, “particu-
larly one that can get beyond a motion to dismiss,”115 has an important 
consequence. “The desire to avoid litigation . . . provides a lever for in-
fluencing the conduct of senior management and the board.”116 Likewise, 
when the deterrence query is fixated upon a threatened mischief to 
shareholders themselves, there is then a basis to allow some recovery out 
of prophylactic concerns in order to reiterate that directors possess an 
ultimate responsibility to the shareholders.117 
Finally, and similar to the case in class actions put forward by 
Rubenstein,118 the institutional upshot of the derivative action device 
is the growth of a private group of law enforcers. By enabling litigation, 
                                                                                                  
 110. Rubenstein, supra note 89, at 724. 
 111. See also id. at 59–66 (for a discussion of the role of deterrence in derivative ac-
tions). 
 112. John C. Coffee, Jr., New Myths and Old Realties: The American Law Institute 
Faces the Derivative Action, 48 BUS. LAW. 1407, 1428 (1993) [hereinafter Coffee, New 
Myths and Old Realties]. 
 113. In this respect, Shavell explains that the social benefits of litigation could exceed 
the private benefits in some instances. An illustration would be where the action gener-
ates some beneficial deterrent effects that cause others to desist from a course of conduct 
that would impose externalities on society. Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private 
Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 334 (1982). 
 114. For example, a study in the United States has shown that the “impact of decisions 
in derivative cases like Caremark, Disney, and Oracle goes well beyond the outcome of 
the cases themselves. These decisions changed the rules for future legal practice by forc-
ing companies to accept better conduct and procedures.” Robert Thompson & Randall S. 
Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 
1749 (2004). 
 115. Robert H. Mundheim, Commentary: The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 
BROOK. L. REV. 55, 57 (1999). 
 116. Id. In other words, education of the board and senior management may well be an 
ancillary benefit when assessing the impact of these actions. 
 117. See REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 184–87. 
 118. Id. 
2012] PUBLIC FUNDING OF DERIVATIVE CLAIMS 1047 
the derivative action has the structural effect of sharing law en-
forcement among public agencies and private enforcers and of reallo-
cating a substantial amount of that enforcement to the private sec-
tor. The latter may be classified as a significant value if private en-
forcement is, as often argued, more efficient than public enforcement. 
Even if private enforcement produces its own difficulties (e.g. the 
agency costs that derivative actions generate), “the sheer diversity of 
enforcers should generate more innovations than a monopolistic gov-
ernment enforcer would produce. These structural effects are not the im-
mediate purpose of any particular piece of derivative action litigation, 
yet they are critical externalities of class suits.”119 
2.2.2 The Public Character of Derivative Claims 
The second question that arises asks why is it assumed in Amendment 
16 that there would even be “a public interest” in bringing a derivative 
action? After all, in the corporate setting, a derivative action can be per-
ceived as being just another commercial dispute as it usually addresses 
purely private injuries. For example, it is not uncommon for an English 
court to characterize its objective as simply doing justice to those harmed 
by the director’s misconduct, i.e. it is concerned with a resolution of a 
private dispute (likely compensation).120 
                                                                                                  
 119. Rubenstein, supra note 89, at 724–25 (citation omitted). For a recent exploration 
of this see Lars Klöhn, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Laws—A Law & Economics 
Perspective 13–14 (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich Working Paper, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1730308. Public en-
forcement resources may also be inadequate. On the general problem of public law en-
forcement see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement 
of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 406–07 (A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven 
Shavell eds., 2006). Standard policy analysis in corporate law strongly favors the private 
side. It is usually thought that “private enforcement benefits from the sharp prod of finan-
cial incentives, while public enforcers are civil servants working within burdensome ad-
ministrative contexts.” W.W. Bratton & M.L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud 
on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 163  (2011). “Effective public and private en-
forcement reinforces self discipline as the real threat of legal action compels companies 
to tighten their governance processes to ensure conduct consistent with the law.” MALAY. 
SEC. COMM’N, Chapter 6: Public and Private Enforcement, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
BLUEPRINT 65 (2011) [hereinafter MALAY. SEC. COMM’N REPORT], available at 
http://www.sc.com.my/eng/html/cg/cg2011/pdf/cg_blueprint2011.pdf. Given a limited 
public apparatus, it follows that any private enforcement is better than none. Bratton & 
Wachter, supra, at 70. 
 120. The latter objective is well illustrated in the reasoning of Nurcombe v. Nurcombe 
[1985] 1 W.L.R. 370, 378 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.) (U.K.). 
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However, as Cox explained elsewhere,121 “few shareholder actions en-
tail breaches of a private contract between the plaintiffs and the [ac-
tion]’s defendants.”122 Instead, most actions are based on breaches of 
fiduciary obligations or, more commonly, fraud. It is clear then that in 
most derivative actions the norm invoked has a substantial, if not exclu-
sive, public source and importance.123 Indeed, it has been argued that 
“[t]he right for a minority shareholder to take derivative action performs 
the purpose of checking majority abuse of the company and is thus a 
public good provided by regulation which otherwise would not be if left 
to private bargain.”124 Or as an advisory committee in Australia usefully 
put it, “private enforcement accomplished via shareholder litigation may 
be preferable to public enforcement.”125 As such, “[t]his area of law is 
thus more mandatory/prohibitory in nature and should not be contractu-
                                                                                                  
 121. REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 68–69. 
 122. James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 11 
(1999). 
 123. This point was usefully framed in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado wherein the Court 
held that it “should, when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and 
public policy in addition to the corporation’s best interests.” 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 
1981). Perhaps the best example is where a derivative action holds an entire board of 
experienced directors liable for breach of duty. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
880, 893 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009), super-
seded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (West). Arguably we all benefited from the 
“public good” provided by Mr. Moir’s plight in Wallersteiner v. Moir, [1975] Q.B. 373 
(U.K.). There is also ample evidence from the US to support this point. Rosenfeld v. 
Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971) “set a standard of conduct which reverberated 
throughout” the mutual fund industry. 
The case held that an adviser to a mutual fund occupied a fiduciary relationship 
to it and could not sell that position for a profit. The profit in that situation 
amounted to pennies per share. But the point here is that the case set a standard 
of conduct for an entire industry. The same could be said of many other notable 
[cases]: Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Moses v. Burgin, 
445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), 
to name a few. None of those derivative actions involved large recoveries for 
the [companies] for whom they were brought. And certainly if you calculated 
the recoveries on a share by share basis, they would have been [tiny]. But they 
were of immeasurable importance to the integrity of corporate governance by 
setting standards for corporate actors. 
Stanley M. Gorssman, Commentary: The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 
BROOK. L. REV. 47, 47–48 (1999). 
 124. Iris H. Chiu, Contextualising Shareholders’ Disputes: A Way to Reconceptualise 
Minority Shareholder Remedies, 2006 J. BUS. L. 312, 337 (emphasis added). 
 125. COMPANIES & SEC. ADVISORY COMM., REPORT ON A STATUTORY DERIVATIVE 
ACTION (1993). 
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ally waived or modified.”126 In addition, the corporate group, rather than 
“private partnership,” has become “the quintessential model of corporate 
business activity in the late twentieth century.”127 In this context, corpo-
rate activity (and in particular the exercising of directors’ discretion in 
business decision-making) has become more of a “public” concern, 
which should therefore be subject to greater judicial scrutiny in order to 
protect individual members’ rights.128 
In theory, therefore, “derivative actions provide a public link to the 
norm by requiring resolution in court, where potentially a public voice, 
the court, addresses the facts of each case through the lens of the appli-
cable norm.”129 Moreover, attracting judicial attention to the public po-
tential of the derivative action is strongly supported by the traditional 
raison d’être of the derivative action.130 Standing to bring a derivative 
action is conferred as otherwise a wrong to the company will go without 
redress.131 Such an approach invites early consideration of the public 
character of derivative actions.132 Moreover, as Coffee rightly noted, 
                                                                                                  
 126. Chiu, supra note 124, at 338. This is because the investor protection objective, 
which could be pursued in a minority derivative action in court, may not be capable of 
being met through private bargain. It should be noted that in the United States where the 
contrarian approach is more widely accepted, modification of the minority derivative 
action by allowing derivative grievances to be arbitrated in lieu of a derivative action in 
court has become acceptable. See Jeffrey A. Sanborn, The Rise of “Shareholder Deriva-
tive Arbitration” in the Public Corporation: In Re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative 
Litigation, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 337, 340 (1996); see also Andrew J. Sockol, A 
Natural Evolution: Compulsory Arbitration of Shareholder Derivative Suits in Publicly 
Traded Corporations, 77 TULANE L. REV. 1095, 1111, 1114 (2003) (arguing that share-
holder arbitration should become the norm for derivative actions); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Pragmatism’s Role in Interpretation, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901, 905 (2008). 
 127. Stephen Bottomley, Shareholders’ Derivative Actions and Public Interest Suits: 
Two Versions of the Same Story?, 15 UNIV. N.S.W. L.J. 127, 141–42 (1992). 
 128. Id. For judicial recognition (in Canada) of the public role of management, and the 
corresponding need for strict standards of conduct see Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. 
O’Malley, [1973] S.C.R. 592, 610 (Can.). 
 129. Arad Reisberg, Shareholders’ Remedies: The Choice of Objectives and the Social 
Meaning of Derivative Actions, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 227 (2005) (emphasis in origi-
nal). “While the reality is that most cases settle, a flow of adjudicated cases is necessary 
to provide guidance on the law and, most importantly, to create credible threat of litiga-
tion if settlement is not achieved.” GENN, supra note 92, at 21. 
 130. For example, the fact that a member may bring a derivative action in relation to 
wrongs which were done to the company before he became a member. See generally 
Seaton v. Grant, [1867] L.R. 2 Ch. App. 459 (Eng.) (which illustrates that compensation 
cannot be the sole rationale i.e. “true injury” is not required). 
 131. Smith v. Croft (No 2), [1988] Ch. 114 at 186 (Eng.). 
 132. See also Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, The Social Responsibility of Companies, 
15 MELB. U. L. REV. 4, 24 (1985) (“[fiduciary duty] is imposed in private law, but with a 
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once private disputes are transported into the domain of a public court-
room, a limited public interest must be accepted as attaching to the deci-
sion procedure.133 This public interest does not mean that every cause of 
action should be litigated at whatever cost to the company and its share-
holders, nonetheless it does require that courts steer their business in a 
suitable fashion. For example, if a court is told that bribery is a profitable 
yet illegal method of doing business and a company demonstrates a plan 
to carry on with such conduct, then that court is morally compromised if 
it straightaway dismisses the action.134 
2.2.3 The “Public Interest” Fallacy? 
The discussion about the “public character” of derivative actions so far 
presupposed a resolution of the dispute in court. However, Amendment 
16 additionally provides discretion for ISA to decide on matters of “pub-
lic interest.” In other words, the legislature intervened in this area imply-
ing two policy premises: first, that there should be more public enforce-
ment in this area of law (or put more accurately, that public enforcement 
should complement private enforcement when it is in the public “inter-
est” to do so), and second, that it is in the “public interest” that more 
such cases be brought (i.e. there are not enough derivative action cases 
brought). This, nonetheless, raises some questions that warrant attention. 
2.2.3.1 Is There a Market Failure That Requires Intervention? 
The general justification for government intervention most commonly 
used by mainstream economists, mostly rests on the view that a particu-
lar market can be enhanced because it “fails”—that is, it does not achieve 
“public interest” objectives. It follows that the state should intervene to 
regulate what would otherwise be the market outcome.135 This seems to 
be the case in this discussion. In spite of the various measures introduced 
for the derivative action procedure since the Israeli Companies Law was 
introduced in 2000,136 very few derivative action cases are initiated by 
private enforcers (leaving for a second the question of whether this is 
                                                                                                  
public function. It is a vehicle of a social purpose.”) (emphasis in original). See generally 
J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF 
COMPANY LAW 200–36 (1993). 
 133. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering 
between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 817 (1983). 
 134. Id. 
 135. JOHN BLUNDELL & COLIN ROBINSON, REGULATION WITHOUT THE STATE . . . THE 
DEBATE CONTINUES 3 (2000). 
 136. See supra Section C. 
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true or not).137 And so a governmental body, namely ISA, is charged with 
improving the situation. But, as will be seen next, there are a number of 
fundamental problems with this “market-failure” approach to policy-
making. 
a. The Infrequency of Proceedings Argument 
There is an important point to be made here, which relates to the ar-
guably low number of cases brought under Israeli law. Very much like 
the U.K., which despite reforms138 has not seen an increase in the number 
of derivative actions,139 there are currently few derivative actions brought 
in Israel by private plaintiffs. Likewise in Canada, where the statutory 
derivative action has been part of the law for many years, although the 
device hasn’t been used very frequently, there have still been some influ-
ential cases. Canadian writers have therefore opined that the “statutory 
derivative action has failed to make a dramatic [practical] impact.”140 
Focusing on the infrequency of proceedings may, nonetheless, be a mis-
leading portrayal as “[i]t is not necessarily a flaw that there may in prac-
tice be few cases brought under the derivative action jurisdiction.”141 Ar-
guably, this fact is actually in line with the very nature of the derivative 
action, as is explained next. 
First and foremost, recall that a derivative action is an action that 
should only be brought in exceptional circumstances. The principle un-
derlying the limitations on the derivative action, that generally the com-
pany is the proper plaintiff and that only in exceptional circumstances 
cases should shareholders be able to sue on its behalf, is a sound one.142 
                                                                                                  
 137. A “worrying feature” of this policy was that it “proceeded on the basis of anec-
dote and the partial views of different actors within the system.” GENN, supra note 92, at 
62. This phenomena of “policy making in the dark” is, however, a common feature of 
civil justice reviews around the world conducted in the absence of any research or em-
pirical data. Id.; see also infra Section C.2.2.3.1 a–c.  
 138. As the Company Law White Paper acknowledged it is possible but unlikely that 
putting derivative actions on a statutory footing will affect the low number of cases 
brought. DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., COMPANY LAW REFORM, 2005, at 275, cmt. 6454 
(U.K.). 
 139. See, e.g., Coffee, Privatization and Corporate Governance, supra note 21, at 2 
(noting the sharp contrast between the UK and US in shareholder enforcement); Eilis 
Ferran, Company Law Reform in the UK, 5 SING. J. INT’L &  COMP. L. 516, 541 (2001). 
 140. Brian R. Cheffins & Janet M. Dine, Shareholder Remedies: Lessons from Can-
ada, 13 COMPANY LAW. 89, 94 (1992). 
 141. S. Deakin, E. Ferran & R. Nolan, Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies: An Over-
view, 2 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 162, 164 (1997); Pearlie Koh Ming Choo, 
The Statutory Derivative Action in Singapore—A Critical Examination, 13 BOND L. REV. 
64, 81 (2001). 
 142. See REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 77–80. 
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No one would welcome a change in the law that opened the floodgates to 
corporate litigation. The real problem with the law as it presently stands 
is, although in theory it contains a derivative action, the rules relating to 
it have become so uncertain and obscure that no one can confidently pre-
dict when such an action will be allowed to proceed, if at all.143 This last 
point is indeed confirmed by the view of one practitioner.144 
Second, given the deterrence objective of the action, a positive inter-
pretation could be that the evidence in Canada indicates that the action is 
indeed working. A low number of litigated actions does not necessarily 
indicate that the derivative action is failing to make an impact. In fact, if 
the courts had been swamped with derivative applications, the fear ex-
pressed by the U.K. Law Commission and others that the availability of 
the action has potential to expand companies’ involvement in futile and 
disruptive litigation145 would certainly have been vindicated. There will 
always be fraud and corporate malpractice. The law has not eliminated 
these, nor will derivative actions or any other mechanism of corporate 
governance. It is nevertheless likely that the derivative action, if per-
ceived as a potent threat and if freed of its procedural handcuffs, may 
have an effect on those involved in corporate governance and, over the 
long run, may change their values and the ways in which they go about 
their tasks. There will be cases where such proceedings justify redressing 
serious corporate abuse “on the ground of necessity alone in order to 
prevent a wrong going without redress.”146 
Finally, the infrequency of proceedings as a likely inaccurate pointer to 
the effectiveness of the derivative action can also be seen from the expe-
rience with the U.K. wrongful trading actions.147 The available evidence 
indicates a relatively low number of wrongful trading petitions, espe-
                                                                                                  
 143. Deakin et al., supra note 141, at 164–65; see also Reisberg, Derivative Claims, 
supra note 3, at 47. 
 144. Kosmin suggests that the average practitioner often gives up in despair and turns 
to alternative routes, not always successful ones, and that the Law Commission’s descrip-
tion of the law in this area as being virtually inaccessible save to lawyers specializing in 
the field is being too generous. Leslie Kosmin, Minority Shareholders’ Remedies: A 
Practitioner Perspective, 2 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 201, 212–13 (1997). 
 145. For a firm advocate of this view see, for example, Christopher Hale, What’s Right 
with the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle?, 2 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 219, 226 
(1997). 
 146. Smith v. Croft (No 2), [1988] Ch. 114 at 185 (Eng.). 
 147. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 (U.K.). For a stimulating discussion on what is 
generally the socially optimal level of litigation given its expense and how it compares to 
the privately determined level of litigation see generally Steven Shavell, The Level of 
Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 99 (1999). 
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cially compared with disqualification proceedings.148 There are different 
views about the extent to which Section 214 of the relevant Insolvency 
Act has been a success.149 At the same time, although there has not been 
an abundance of cases in the area, there have been important ones.150 
More notably, it has been suggested that the infrequency of proceedings 
is probably not an accurate pointer to the effectiveness of the sections.151 
In many situations the wrongful trading sections are operating on the 
minds of directors who will have been warned about the dangers they 
face once the company becomes insolvent.152 It can be seen then that the 
legislation presents an important theoretical limitation on the otherwise 
prevalent doctrine of limited liability. And there is no reason to assume 
that the same incentives could not present themselves with respect to de-
rivative action litigation. 
Returning to the Israeli context, we already mentioned that the prevail-
ing perception in Israel seems to be that there are not enough or suffi-
cient derivative actions cases brought by private enforcers. Not only is 
this based on anecdote and the partial views of different actors within the 
system, but, in fact, the level of investor protection (such as by means of 
shareholder suits) afforded by the Israeli system is relatively high by in-
ternational standards, which suggests that an argument for reform that 
rests predominantly on the perception of low level of litigation is mis-
guided. For example, according to the World Bank Doing Business 2011 
Report, Israel is ranked 5 in the world (out of 183 economies) in terms of 
the level of protection afforded to investors (see Figure 2 below), and its 
strength of investor protection index is 8.3 (out of 10), which is much 
higher than the OECD average of 6 (see Table 1 below). These figures 
makes the case for reform, which rests on the infrequency of proceed-
                                                                                                  
 148. See Rizwaan J. Mokal, An Agency Cost Analysis of the Wrongful Trading Provi-
sions: Redistribution, Perverse Incentives and the Creditors’ Bargain, 59 C.L.J. 335, 
335–57 (2000). It is estimated that disqualification cases are now reaching a figure of 
1,500 per year. See A. Hicks, Wrongful Trading—Has it been a Failure? 9 INSOLVENCY 
L. & PRAC. 134 (1993); Rebecca Perry & David Milman, Transaction Avoidance Provi-
sions in Corporate Insolvency: An Empirical Study, 14 INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 280 
(1998). 
 149. See, e.g., B.G. PETTET, COMPANY LAW (2005) 36–37; see also Fidelis Oditah, 
Wrongful Trading, LLOYD’S MAR. COM. L.Q. 205 (1990); Mokal, supra note 148, at 148. 
 150. See generally Re Produce Mktg. Consortium Ltd. (No. 2), [1989] B.C.L.C. 520 
(Eng.); see also Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd., [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 180 (Eng.); Re Sherborne 
Associates Ltd. [1995], B.C.C. 40 (Eng.); Re Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd., [2000] 
1 B.C.L.C. 275 (Eng.). 
 151. PETTET, supra note 149, at 36–37. 
 152. Id. 
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ings, even more shaky and raises questions as to whether there was in-
deed a need to go that far by providing public funding. 
 
Figure 2153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                  
 153. See Doing Business Report, supra note 66. This measures the strength of minority 
shareholder protections against misuse of corporate assets by directors for their personal 
gain. This methodology was developed by Simeon Djankov et al., Debt Enforcement 
Around the World, 116 J. POL. ECON. 1105 (2008). This is, of course, not the only meth-
odology available. A number of academic works offer additional insights into investor 
protection. See Priya P. Lele & Mathias S. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric 
Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007) (proposing a shareholder protection index for 
five countries and code the development of the law for over three decades); John Armour 
et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the 
Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343 (2009) (using a panel data set 
covering a range of developed and developing countries, showing that common law sys-
tems were more protective of shareholder interests than civil-law ones in the period 
1995–2005 and that civilian systems were catching up, suggesting that legal origin was 
not much of an obstacle to formal convergence in shareholder protection law); Simon 
Deakin & Mathias Siems, Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present, and Future 
Research, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 120 (2010) (reporting the results 
of a new approach to coding which has produced longitudinal data sets on shareholder, 
creditor, and worker protection). There has also been some academic criticism of the 
above overall ranking, in particular in the literature on law and finance and amongst 
economists. See, e.g., Claude Ménard & Betrand du Marais, Can We Rank Legal Systems 
According to Their Economic Efficiency?, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2008); Benito 
Arruñada, Pitfalls to Avoid When Measuring Institutions: Is Doing Business Damaging 
Business?, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 729 (2007). 
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Table 1: Israel-OECD 154 
Strength of Investor Protection Index155 
Indicator Israel OECD  
Average 
Extent of disclosure index (0-10)  7 6 
Extent of director liability index 
(0-10) 
9 5.2 
Ease of shareholder suits index 
(0-10) 
9 6.9 
Strength of investor protection 
index (0-10) 
8.3 6 
b. The Unattainable Ideal 
The second problem with the “market-failure” approach to policy-
making in this context is that, as Blundell puts it “the market-failure ap-
proach implies perfect government—an altruistic and omniscient body, 
which can detect and will unswervingly pursue the “public interest.” 
“But, of course, this disregards the self-interest of its own members or 
more general political considerations. The contrast between ‘imperfect’ 
markets with perfect governments is naturally deceptive as it leads to 
                                                                                                  
 154. Adapted from Doing Business Report, supra note 66. 
 155. The Protecting Investors indicators below measure three areas: transparency of 
transactions (Extent of Disclosure Index), which looks at who can approve related-party 
transactions and requirements for external and internal disclosure in case of related-party 
transactions. The second is liability for self-dealing (Extent of Director Liability Index), 
which consists of the ability of shareholders to hold the interested party and the approv-
ing body liable in case of a prejudicial related-party transaction, the available legal reme-
dies (damages—repayment of profits, fines, imprisonment, and rescission of the transac-
tion), and the ability of shareholders to sue directly or derivatively. The third area, share-
holders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct (Ease of Shareholder Suits 
Index) looks at documents and information available during trial as well as access to 
internal corporate documents (directly or through a government inspector). The indexes 
vary between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating greater disclosure, greater liability 
of directors, greater powers of shareholders to challenge the transaction, and better inves-
tor protection. A simple average of the extent of disclosure, the extent of director liability 
and ease of shareholder suits indices then makes up the overall score (i.e. the strength of 
investor protection index (0-10)). See Doing Business Report, supra note 66. 
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demands for more government intervention than would be made if the 
imperfects of government were taking into consideration.”156 In short, the 
problem with this government intervention hypothesis is that it rests on 
uncertain foundations of principle and as such leads to leads to practical 
problems. Government advocates’ frequently touted assumption that “it 
will on balance be beneficial and achieve that elusive concept, the ‘pub-
lic interest’” is flawed and illegitimate.157 
Indeed, public regulators, such as ISA, cannot be insulated from politi-
cal and interest group pressures.158 Put simply, there may be difficulties 
associated with the introduction and implementation of regulatory meas-
ures (i.e. interest groups may have too large an influence on the law-
making process),159 or lack of familiarity with the marketplace. This may 
result with a distorted outcome: regulators may, in practice, serve the 
private interest of the regulated industry and, ironically, protect it from 
any competition, instead of the supposed goal to promote the public in-
terest. This suggests that political pressures stipulate a background incen-
tive that is somewhat different than the one that exists for private regula-
tors.160 “But worse, it is a fallacy to assume that government officials are 
disinterested purveyors of the public interest. They are themselves per-
sonally interested, in terms of salary and career prospects, in the outcome 
of the regulatory process.”161 Indeed, “there is no reason to believe that 
the priorities established by a corporate regulator for enforcement are 
necessarily the correct ones [or are identical to those of each and every 
company]. This dictates a role for private enforcement.”162 Finally, 
when the legal system assigns an enforcement role [(or alternatively 
leaves room for) private enforcers (i.e. through litigation of derivative 
actions)] there is less need to rely on public agencies and in turn the 
tendency of such public agencies . . . to determine, sometimes arbitrar-
                                                                                                  
 156. BLUNDELL, supra note 135, at 3–4. The “public choice” approach, which criti-
cizes the perfect government assumption, is explained in GORDON TULLOCK, THE VOTE 
MOTIVE (2006); see also WILLIAM MITCHELL, GOVERNMENT AS IT IS (1988). 
 157. See, e.g., REGULATION: ECONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY (Jack High ed., 1991) 
(critiquing the “public interest” theory). 
 158. BLUNDELL, supra note 135, at 74–75. “In Chicago, the police cars are emblazoned 
with the phrase ‘we serve and protect,’ and often that phrase can be applied to public 
regulators.” Id. 
 159. These issues are explored in detail in BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: 
THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION ch. 4 (1997). 
 160. Randall S. Kroszner, The Role of Private Regulation in Maintaining Global Fi-
nancial Stability, 18 CATO J. 355, 359 (1999). 
 161. BLUNDELL, supra note 135, at 34. 
 162. Ramsay, supra note 14, at 152. 
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ily or for political reasons, not to enforce rights or duties it had previ-
ously guarded163 
is likely to be higher. 
c. Limited Resources and Funding 
There is a policy question that arises: should shareholders be expecting 
public enforcers, in this case, ISA, to pick up the bill for litigation, 
thereby externalizing the cost of enforcement on the taxpayers? The an-
swer is not as straightforward as it would seem. When the Israeli legisla-
tor decided in favor of making a stronger commitment to enforcement of 
derivative actions by allowing ISA to fund these actions, it probably pre-
sumed that the necessary monies would be available at no extra cost to 
the taxpayers. In theory, this assumption is correct: ISA is funded by fees 
it collects from exchange transactions and related activities.164 But that is 
not the real issue here. The true problem lies with the fact that ISA needs 
to allocate its resources to a wide-range of activities it oversees, super-
vises, and enforces. However, like many similar statutory securities bod-
ies worldwide, it is only provided with a very limited budget.165 In fact, 
ISA is considered to be chronically underfunded, thus foreclosing a shift 
to public enforcement. Indeed, limits on funding and resources of corpo-
rate regulators means that they cannot, of necessity, pursue all breaches 
and enforcement of the law. In this respect ISA is in a somewhat similar 
position to that of the SEC166 or the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority 
                                                                                                  
 163. Id. (citing A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS Part VII, 220–21 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1982) (on why private en-
forcement serves a fail-safe function and ensures greater stability in the application of 
law.). 
 164. ISA is funded by annual fees payable by companies that are subject to the Securi-
ties Law and the Joint Investment Law, fees payable for applications to receive permits to 
publish prospectuses, private offerings, licensing fees payable by investment advisors and 
investment portfolio managers, and fees payable by the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The 
budget is approved by the Minister of Finance and the Finance Committee of the Knesset.  
 165. The Israel Securities Authority was established under the Securities Law, 1968 
and its mandate is to protect the interests of the investing public. ISA has a wide range of 
responsibilities and powers. See ISA in a Nutshell, supra note 69. 
 166. As the New York Times reported on September 20, 2011: 
The near-collapse of the world financial system in the fall of 2008 and the 
global credit crisis that followed gave rise to widespread calls for changes in 
the regulatory system. A year and a half later, in July 2010, Congress passed a 
bill, [which later became the Dodd-Frank Act], expanding the federal govern-
ment’s role in the markets, reflecting a renewed mistrust of financial markets. 
A year after the Dodd-Frank Act was signed, necessitating the creation of thou-
sands of job positions, the SEC has been expanding headcount. 
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(“FSA”), and the right question, in particular in light of the recent finan-
cial crisis and what has been on the agenda in terms of reforms is as fol-
lows: has ISA got the necessary and/or adequate resources to deal with 
what is already on its table? ISA, like the SEC, is under huge pressures 
and its budget has recently been under-cut. It follows that it probably 
cannot, as a practical matter, allocate enough resources or time or exper-
tise to pursue yet another regulatory role. If it does, some other area of its 
activities would suffer, which raises the question whether that decision 
would be in the “public interest”. 
In short, public enforcement resources are generally inadequate.167 This 
means there is a constant and ongoing internal competition for resources 
and priorities within ISA, where some areas get to be prioritized over 
others.168 In particular, it is reported that the issue of private enforcement 
                                                                                                  
Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_r
egulatory_reform/index.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2011). Under the Act the SEC is 
responsible for implementing a series of regulatory initiatives required. Implementing the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last modified May 8, 2012) (which ex-
panded the SEC mandate including creating five new offices). The SEC 2011 study ‘Or-
ganizational Study and Reform’ (March 2011) provides a detailed account of these and 
other changes: 
According to the SEC’s 2012 budget request it hopes to fill 780 positions by 30 
September 2012, the end of fiscal year 2012. [Three hundred and twelve] posi-
tions would go toward strengthening core operations, like gathering market in-
telligence, monitoring financial disclosures of corporations and overseeing 
money market funds. The other 468 positions would deal with implementing 
new rules from the Act relating to the derivatives market, overseeing hedge 
funds and whistle-blowing. In addition to examiners, the agency will hire 
staffers with experience in derivatives, credit default swaps, collateralized debt 
obligations and securitized products as well as compliance officers. 
BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/967study.pdf.  
 167. “The maximum number of approved positions at ISA as of the end of December 
2009 stood at 181, in addition to eight intern positions and ten student positions.” See 
ISA, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 3 (May 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_5219.pdf. The SEC, by comparison, currently 
has a support staff of around 3,800, made up of lawyers, accountants, economists, com-
puter experts and administrators. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM. [SEC], FY 2011 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (Nov. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf. 
 168. This issue is well-illustrated in the annual business plan published by ISA or the 
U.K. Financial Services Authority which outlines regulatory and strategic priorities for 
the regulator each year. See generally FIN. SERVICES AUTH., BUSINESS PLAN 2011/12 
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of securities laws has not been one of the top priorities of ISA in recent 
years.169 How does this sit with the new expectation that ISA funds de-
rivative claims in appropriate cases remains to be seen. One answer to 
this may be to recognize that there is no need to have many cases in or-
der to achieve high levels of deterrence. For example, the use of a few 
“test cases” may be sufficient to deter potential abuse by directors who 
are situated similarly at other companies.170 
2.2.4 What is the Relationship between ISA’s Recommendation and the 
Court’s Discretion? 
Recall that 209A(b) states: 
Where the Israel Securities Authority is convinced that the action is in 
the interests of the public and that there is a reasonable prospect that the 
court approve it . . . the Authority may bear the plaintiff’s costs, in such 
sum and on such conditions as it shall prescribe; the Authority’s deci-
sions according to this section cannot be used as an evidence and it is 
not possible to submit them before the court.171 
On its face, this Section recognizes that ISA’s decisions cannot be used 
as evidence and are inadmissible in court, which suggests that there was 
a fear that they would influence the court in some way. But even if the 
content of these decisions is now known, the fact that ISA has deliber-
ated and concluded that public money should be spent on a case on the 
grounds that there is a “public interest” in the case will not escape the 
court. This raises panoply of interesting questions: what weight should 
be given to ISA’s decisions? In other words, what would be the implica-
tions for a particular case’s chances of succeeding that it is supported by 
ISA? Would this bias the court in favor of allowing the case to continue 
on the grounds that ISA has already made its own “judgment” that the 
case is of general interest/importance to the public? Furthermore, should 
the court accede to the committee’s decision or should it review the deci-
sion as if the former never occurred? If so, at what cost? Or perhaps the 
court should only review the committee’s decision if it is suspected to be 
biased? And vice versa: would the fact that ISA, for example, has de-
cided not to support a case, after being approached and after investigat-
ing its merits, be used as a tactical weapon by the defendants in court to 
suggest that there is no “public interest” in litigating this case? 
                                                                                                  
(U.K.), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/pb2011_12.pdf; ISA ANNUAL 
REPORT 2009, supra note 167.  
 169. See generally ANNUAL REPORT 2009, supra note 167. 
 170. See REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 59–66. 
 171. Companies Law § 209(A) (emphasis added). 
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It is noteworthy that a comparable problem arises in the context of ju-
dicial review of the merits of a decision of a committee of independent 
directors in the United States (known as a Special Litigation Commit-
tees) in derivative litigation:172 
The question is to what extent . . . should a court defer to a recommen-
dation of [Commission]? In practice, unsurprisingly, this fundamental 
question has been fiercely debated in U.S. courts and proposed Model 
Acts with no clear resolution emerging. Secondly, if judicial review of 
the merits of a decision of a committee of independent directors is util-
ized, this may be seen as an undesirable duplication of tasks.173 
                                                                                                  
 172. Arad Reisberg, Theoretical Reflections on Derivative Actions in English Law: 
The Representative Problem, 3 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 69, 69–108 (2006)  [here-
inafter Reisberg, The Representative Problem]; see Ramsay, supra note 14, at 173; Jerold 
Solovy, Barry Levenstam & Daniel S. Goldman, The Role of Special Litigation Commit-
tees in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 25 TORT & INS. J. 864, 864–65 (1990). 
 173. Reisberg, The Representative Problem, supra note 172, at 89–90, 93–94; see 
Ramsay, supra note 14, at 173. While some courts have shown considerable deference to 
recommendations of SLCs (Auerbach v. Benett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623 (1979)), others re-
jected any notion of wholesale deference to the recommendation of the SLC. For exam-
ple, the influential Delaware Supreme Court decision in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado 
applied a two-stage test on whether to accept its recommendations: “First, the Court 
should inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee” and the grounds 
supporting its recommendation. 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1981). Second, the court 
applies “its own independent business judgment” to determine whether the derivative 
action should be dismissed. Id. The Zapata analysis has subsequently been applied by the 
Delaware Court of Chancery numerous times. Outside of Delaware, in many states (in-
cluding California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, and Virginia) there 
appears to be no clear decision by the highest state court on the status of SLCs, but fed-
eral courts hearing derivative actions based on diversity jurisdiction have reached deci-
sions construing the authority of such a committee. Although some argue that the law on 
derivative actions is uniform nationally in the sense that everyone has followed Dela-
ware, Coffee believes that it is an egregious overstatement to characterize the law on 
SLCs as largely resolved. See Coffee, New Myths and Old Realties, supra note 112, at 
1432–33. In In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
denied the motion of a SLC to dismiss derivative claims brought by Oracle stockholders. 
824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). The SLC was established by the board of directors of the 
Oracle Corporation to investigate claims of insider trading and breach of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty brought against Oracle directors. The court based its finding on the SLC’s 
inability to prove the independence of its two members, and thus the committee itself, 
from the directors being investigated. In doing so, the court applied an independence 
inquiry that expanded upon the traditional “domination and control” notion of independ-
ence, to include personal and philanthropic connections with the directors, which the 
court concluded created an “unacceptable risk of bias.” Id. at 947. Arguably, this repre-
sents a broadening of the inquiry of director independence by the Delaware Court of 
Chancery. See Jeremy J. Kobeski, In Re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation: Has a 
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The same may apply to ISA’s decisions. Although there is no doubt 
that the court is free to decide on the case regardless of (or in spite of) 
ISA’s position, what is clear is that the balance is shifted in favor of the 
plaintiff even before the case or its merits are heard. No doubt, this can 
be rebutted. It, nonetheless, at least puts forward the notion that there is a 
prima facie case to be looked at closely. 
2.2.5 ISA’s Recommendation and Decision 
One last issue should be considered here. On what grounds/how will 
ISA decide to support a case? 
Since the entry into force of Amendment 16, ISA has not yet received 
any formal request for funding a derivative action according to Section 
205A.174 That said, ISA officials report “an awakening in the field” and 
that they have been in contact with a number of lawyers who are “sniff-
ing” around and may be interested in filing derivative actions.175 Al-
though it is still in its early days and ISA has not yet published a guid-
ance document on how it would finance derivatives action or about en-
forcement information in general,176 it is expected that the issue of pri-
vate enforcement of securities laws in the near future be allowed more 
                                                                                                  
New Species of Director Independence Been Uncovered?, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 850–
51 (2004). 
  Contrast the Model Business Corporation Act (drafted by the American Bar As-
sociation’s committee on Corporate Governance) which provides that a derivate action 
shall be dismissed by the court where a committee of independent directors has deter-
mined in its business judgment that the action is not in the best interest of the company, 
with that of the American Law Institute, which allows more scope for judicial review of 
the recommendations of SLC. See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 
725–66. 
 174. Data received from ISA Officials (based on direct conversations and e-mails) 
(2012) (on file with author). 
 175. Id. This may also receive a boost from a recent decision of the Economics De-
partment at the District Court in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa to allow a double derivative action, al-
though such an arrangement is not catered for in the Companies Law of 1999. See Jona-
than Ben-Ami v. Mivtachim Holdings Ltd., TA 21785-02-11 [2011] (not yet published) 
(Isr.). On the importance of these type of actions see Arad Reisberg & Dan Prentice, Mul-
tiple Derivative Actions, 125 L.Q. REV. 209 (2009). 
 176. As a public body it is assumed it should provide a policy document that would 
help prospective litigants/lawyers assessing the chances of their respective cases being 
funded by ISA. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that it cannot be helpful to allow the 
factors which ISA will take into account in deciding whether to support a case to prolif-
erate unnecessarily—this can prolong proceedings, create uncertainty, and result in the 
unprincipled development of the jurisdiction. As a public authority, it should reach its 
decision efficiently, speedily and with openness. 
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attention than before.177 So it would be instructive to look at the experi-
ence ISA has had so far with funding class action litigation to get an idea 
on how it will operate in practice and how it may help shape its future 
policy. 
Firstly, it is instructive to look more generally at how ISA perceives its 
own role. The Securities Law defines its role as the protection of inves-
tors’ affairs.178 It is reported that ISA interpreted this provision as defin-
ing its function as creating a fair and functioning capital market. In line 
with this, ISA representatives promote enforcement’s role in encour-
aging investors’ marketplace trust.179 They conceive economic legis-
lation, including corporate law legislation, “as an ordering instrument that 
enables the economy to work, rather than as an independent justice 
mechanism in its own right.”180 Moreover, unlike its U.S. counterpart, 
“ISA views the highly concentrated ownership structure of Israeli com-
panies as the unique and main problem of the Israeli capital market. 
Accordingly, it justifies stricter rules as a means to protect minority 
shareholders against control holders.”181 
Looking more closely at the issue of enforcement, a policy document 
issued by ISA in April 2003 on its website182 provides details of its en-
forcement policy at the time and its intent to ask for amendments in the 
Companies Law which would allow it to enforce the Companies Law 
sections more forcibly.183 The document is quite telling as it reveals some 
of the seeds that led to Amendment 16 as well as the policy issues and 
thinking behind it and more generally the Companies Law.184 In the 
document, ISA explains that the Companies Law eliminated numerous 
criminal sections that were previously part of the Companies Ordi-
nance185 and instead established new enforcement arrangements.186 The 
                                                                                                  
 177. Based on direct conversations and e-mails with ISA Officials (2012) (on file with 
author). 
 178. See Securities Law, 5728-1968, 22 LSI 266, ch. 2 (1968) (Isr.). 
 179. Yael T. Ben-Zion, The Political Dynamics of Corporate Legislation: Lessons 
from Israel, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 187, 243 (2006). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. SEC Initiates a Change to Empower it to Enforce the Companies Act, ISA (Apr. 
7, 2003), http://www.isa.gov.il/Default.aspx?Site=MAIN&ID=8,175,854 [hereinafter 
SEC Initiates a Change]. 
 183. Id. 
 184. For an interesting examination of the political history that accompanied the en-
actment of the Companies Law of 1999 see Ben-Zion, supra note 179. 
 185. The Companies Ordinance, later replaced by the Companies Law, had been 
largely based on the English Act of 1929 but underwent reform several times. 
 186. SEC Initiates a Change, supra note 182. 
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basic concept that underlines the Companies Law on this subject is the 
idea that the most effective enforcement mechanism is the market 
mechanism.187 In principle, the Companies Law avoided criminal sanc-
tions, because its architects sought to move towards civil enforcement. 
The Companies Law also gave priority to ensuring the operation of mar-
ket mechanisms as well as providing incentives for private enforcers. 
Importantly, ISA noted, ISA has not been granted administrative pun-
ishment powers or the ability to take civil proceedings, criminal sanc-
tions, or quasi-criminal sanctions directly against companies that violate 
and/or breach the Companies Law.188 In reality, however, ISA noted, 
there are repeated violations of the sections of the Companies Law, with-
out any real possibility of enforcement. The chances that a shareholder 
would decide to initiate a derivative action or a class action for failing to 
appoint an internal auditor are very slim, because, at least in public com-
panies, such actions are filed only when shareholders themselves have 
suffered direct financial loss.189 It is difficult to prove a causal connection 
between a failure to appoint an internal auditor and direct financial loss 
and therefore the probability of filing a derivative action in these circum-
stances are virtually nil. According to the ISA document, other examples 
of violations that would not trigger shareholders’ enforcement include 
the appointment of a director who was previously convicted of an of-
fense which disqualifies him from serving as a director and convening a 
general meeting without providing the minimum notice as required by 
law.190 
3. What Can Be Learned from the Class Action Experience in Israel? 
3.1 Are Derivative Actions the Same as Class Actions? 
Recall that the rationale for Section 205A makes it clear that the new 
amendment establishes a similar arrangement with exists for class ac-
tions (under Section 209 of the Companies Law)191 and that the plaintiff 
in derivative actions, in addition to benefiting himself (and like the posi-
tion in class actions cases) benefits all other shareholders who are simi-
larly positioned.192 But one may wonder whether it is necessarily the case 
                                                                                                  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. Curiously, these are precisely the instances that should trigger a derivative 
action. See Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 2 Hare 461. 
 191. Companies Act (amend. no. 16), § 19 (explanatory notes) 2011 (Isr.). 
 192. In an earlier draft of the amendment it was stated that the derivative claim has a 
central role in enforcing the company’s right, including enforcing directors’ duties. It is 
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that the plaintiff in derivative actions is in exactly the same position as in 
class actions cases. While class actions and derivative actions share cer-
tain similarities, such as the fact that they usually involve multiple plain-
tiffs, and they both appear in the same part of the Israeli Companies 
Law,193 the purposes and procedures of the two suits are very different. 
Class actions consolidate multiple plaintiffs’ claims into a singular suit. 
This can be contrasted with shareholder derivative actions, which enable 
shareholders to seek relief for the company’s injuries. This distinction 
can be confusing, as shareholders often pursue class action remedies for 
direct injuries suffered. A derivative action is utilized when a company 
itself is injured and first opts not to sue, but the shareholders suffer indi-
rectly and seek action later.194 Thus, the moniker “derivative” action is 
due to shareholders pursuing a claim for the corporation’s instead of his 
own name.195 All shareholders in a derivative action therefore benefit if a 
company recovers. 
3.2 Funding of General Class Action Claims under Israeli Law 
We now turn to examine if there is anything that can be learnt from the 
class action procedure and experience under Israeli law that may help 
assess the prospects of success of Section 205A. 
The Class Action Act 2006 (the “Class Action Act”), defines a class 
action as: 
An action that is conducted on behalf of a group of people, who have 
not authorised the representative plaintiff for this purpose, and which 
raises material questions of fact or law which are common to all the 
members of the class.196 
                                                                                                  
expected the funding would be given for the application at the leave stage including cov-
ering expert and legal opinions as well as any costs that are likely to be incurred in case 
the court should refuse leave. Companies Law of 1999 (amend. no. 10), para. 12 (May 
2008). 
 193. Or to take a U.S. example: under the 2010 California Corporations Code, both 
class actions and derivative actions are found in Chapter 11. CAL. CORP. CODE § 11 
(2010). 
 194. Erika Johansen, Class Action vs. Derivative Shareholder Lawsuits, EHOW.COM, 
http://www.ehow.com/about_6505005_class-vs_-derivative-shareholder-lawsuits.html 
(last visited May 8, 2012). 
 195. What is a shareholder derivative action?, CORPORATE LAW LEGAL RES., 
http://resources.lawinfo.com/en/Legal-FAQs/corporate/Federal/what-is-a-shareholder-
derivative-action.html (last visited May 8, 2012). Interestingly, that an action is truly a 
derivative action, rather than one brought by the minority shareholder in his own right, 
was a late recognition in English law. Wallersteiner v. Moir, [1975] Q.B. 373 (U.K.). 
 196. Class Action Act, 5766-2006, 35 LSI 298, § 2 (2006) (Isr.) [hereinafter Class 
Action Act]. 
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As Plato-Shinar reports, the Class Action Act was enacted “in order to 
encourage the filing of appropriate class actions and to remove proce-
dural impediments. The Law perceives the class action not as a proce-
dural arrangement of the filing of claims, but, first and foremost, as a tool 
for promoting public–social interests.” 197 It follows that the Law’s per-
ception is that 
the consideration and the advancement of the public interest should be 
at the heart of the court’s discretion throughout all the stages of the 
proceeding. At the same time, the Law attempts to contend with the 
risk of the exploitation of the class action in order to make private 
profit, without achieving benefit for the public. The Law takes into 
consideration the interests of the defendants as well, and tries to bal-
ance between them and those of the public. 198 
The Israeli class action is, very much like the class action mechanism 
in the United States—the device serves not only the private interest of 
the injured parties, but also, the social-public interest. It is chiefly geared 
towards situations when a large company injures a group of people in 
such a manner that each individual suffers small damage that would not 
justify the filing of a claim by the individual himself. That said, all of the 
unique persons’ damages amass into an extensive amount, thus the class 
action device groups the often small interests of all the injured parties, 
which are often unpractical to pursue, and generates an incentive to pur-
sue a claim. The class action is thus vitally instrumental in enforcing in-
dividual rights. Resultantly, the class action’s accumulated whole is often 
large and therefore deterrent. Class actions are instrumental in under-
enforced areas, and often when administrative supervision is frag-
mented.199 ISA itself has stated that with respect to potential compensa-
tion to be paid to the plaintiff, it is usually the case that 
if the court rules in favor of all or part of the class with regard to all or 
part of a class action claim, it shall order the payment of compensation 
to the class action plaintiff, taking into consideration the following fac-
tors, unless it finds, for special reasons which shall be recorded, that 
                                                                                                  
 197. Ruth Plato-Shinar, Israel: The New Law on Class Actions, 2007 J. BUS. L. 527, 
540. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 527, 527 n.3; see, e.g., Civil  (TA) 1957/03 Ar-On Investments Ltd v The 
First Int’l Bank of Israel, PM  8560(1) (2006). “In that case, the bank charged some 
15,000 customers with interest higher than that agreed. Only by virtue of class action 
proceedings the Supervisor of Banks intervened and the customers were ultimately com-
pensated.” Class Action Bill (No. 232), 5765–2005, HH 234 (Isr.); Application for Civil 
Appeal 4556/94 Tatzat v. Zilbershatz, 49(5) PD 774, 783–85 [1994] (Isr.); CA 2967/95 
Magen Vekeshet Ltd. 527 [2007] (Isr.) (on file with the author). 
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such payment is not justified under the circumstances of the case: the 
effort invested by the class action plaintiff and the risk he took upon 
himself when submitting the class action and in conducting it; the bene-
fit brought to the members of the class from the conduct of the action;  . 
. . the degree of importance to the general public of the class action.200  
The court may, for special reasons which shall be recorded, order the 
payment of compensation to an applicant or class action plaintiff even 
if the class action claim was not approved, or even if there was no rul-
ing in favor of the class in the class action claim, whichever is rele-
vant.201 
One of the most important innovations in the Class Action Act is the 
establishment of a Foundation for Financing Class Actions, under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Justice.202 The foundation’s objective is to 
assist plaintiffs in the financing of class actions, which are of public and 
social importance.203 The foundation’s budget is determined in the An-
nual Budget Law, in a special plan that is included in the budget of the 
Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice is responsible for determin-
ing the criteria for granting financing to the various representatives. In 
any event, assistance from the foundation will not be given in order to 
finance class actions in the field of securities, because in these cases, fi-
nancing is given by ISA.204 This is considered next. 
3.3 Funding Class Actions in the Field of Securities by ISA 
According to ISA’s own report: 
[t]he ISA regards class action lawsuits as an inextricable component of 
enforcement in the capital market. . . . The Director of Enforcement 
of ISA is charged with the supervision and coordination of all ISA en-
forcement activities, as well as trade control and class actions . . . . 
With regard to class actions, the Enforcement Department of ISA is 
charged with formulating recommendations to ISA Plenum as to appli-
cations to finance such [claims] and private expenditures relating 
thereto; monitoring claim proceedings and deciding whether to involve 
the State Attorney in cases that have ramifications on the efficacy of 
                                                                                                  
 200. Class Action Act, § 22(a)–(b). 
 201. ISA, SELF ASSESSMENT, supra note 43; see also id. § 229(c). 
 202. Plato-Shinar, supra note 197. 
 203. Class Action Act, § 27. 
 204. Companies Law § 209; Joint Investments in Trusts Law, 5754-1994, SH No. 
5754 p. 308, § 41 (Isr.). 
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the class action mechanism and on the public’s trust in the capital 
market.205 
Table 2 below gives an idea about the level of activity at ISA on these 
issues. 
Table 2: Cases forwarded to the Department of Investigations 
at ISA between 2005–2009, by type of violation206 
Type of Violation 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Securities fraud 7 5 1 2 4 19 
Use of inside information 2 4 3 2 6 17 
Misrepresentation (in 
prospectuses, financial 
statements, or immediate 
reports) 
6 2 2 5 4 19 
Non-filing and delinquent 
filing 
 
- 1 11 1 - 3 
Unlicensed portfolio 
management or investment 
advice 
- 2 - - - 2 
Judicial inquiries 2 5 8 7 9 31 
Violations by employees 
of stock exchange members 
and prohibited acts by a li-
censed investment portfolio 
manager 
- 1 1 - - 2 
Disciplinary violations - - 1 - - 1 
                                                                                                  
 205. ANNUAL REPORT 2009, supra note 167, at 5. 
The ISA Plenum deals, through the ISA’s committees, with granting applica-
tions for permission to publish prospectuses; granting exemptions and exten-
sions; stock exchange issues; issues relating to the ISA’s finances and budget; 
the independence of auditors of companies subject to the Securities Law; issues 
relating to the licensing of investment advisors, investment marketers, and in-
vestment portfolio managers; issues relating to the imposition of civil fines on 
mutual fund managers, as well as other issues, as needed. The ISA Plenum usu-
ally convenes once a month. There are currently eight members of the ISA sit-
ting at the ISA Plenum including the ISA’s Chairman. 
Id. at 2. 
 206. Id. at 129. 
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Violations under the Joint 
Investment in Trust Law 
1 - 1 - 1 3 
Violations under the Penal 
Law: Bribery, theft, ob-
taining by fraud 
- - - - 2 2 
Total 18 20 18 17 26  99 
 
Focusing back on class actions, recall that according to Section 209 of 
the Companies Law, “a plaintiff seeking to sue in a representative action 
deriving from a connection to a security of a public company may re-
quest ISA to bear his costs.”207 “Where the Securities Authority is con-
vinced that the action is in the interests of the public and that there is a 
reasonable chance that the court will approve it as a representative ac-
tion, the Authority may bear the plaintiff’s costs, in such sum and on 
such conditions as it shall prescribe.”208 As mentioned above, the out-
come of the case determines the costs in Israel, which means that a plain-
tiff’s success garners court costs. In effect, these costs are designed to 
reflect the actual costs incurred by the plaintiff, but in practice often fail 
to cover the true time and effort expended in pursuit of litigation. Con-
versely, if the plaintiff loses his claim, he is liable for court costs. In case 
of a class action ISA may provide financial assistance and “in practice 
assumes approximately 80% of the costs in the failed class actions it 
chooses to assist. There is no set formula for calculating court costs. 
More often than not, the assigned costs do not cover actual expendi-
tures.”209 
It is reported that 
[B]etween the years 2000, when the Companies Law came into force, 
and 2002, ISA has participated in subsidizing seven class action suits. . 
. . [B]etween 2000 and September 2002, the number of class action 
suits that were reported to ISA was fifteen, out of which eight passed 
the primary stage of approval as a class action by the court.210 
During 2008 two applications for funding class action law claims were 
submitted to ISA. In one case, the applicant withdrew the application 
                                                                                                  
 207. Companies Law § 209(a). 
 208. Id. § 209(b). 
 209. ISA, SELF ASSESSMENT, supra note 43, at 159. 
 210. Ben-Zion, supra note 179, at 308–09; see e.g., ISA, ANNUAL REPORT 2000 
(2000), available at http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/ISAFile_163.pdf; ISA, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2001 (2001), available at http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/ISAFile_162.pdf; 
ISA, ANNUAL REPORT 2002 (2002), available at 
http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/ISAFile_161.pdf. 
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after ISA staff had decided against financing it, and in the other case, 
ISA staff agreed to fund the case. Six applications for funding class ac-
tion lawsuits were received during 2009. At the time that ISA 2010 An-
nual Report was published these lawsuits were still pending review.211 
One financing application from the previous reporting year was with-
drawn by the plaintiff after ISA decided against financing the suit.212 It is 
clear then that ISA’s financial support for a case is a crucial factor in its 
chances to be litigated at all. 
A pair of important class action lawsuits completed during 2009. Both 
were supported by ISA.213 One of these cases illustrates that ISA’s deci-
sion to fund it was the right one under the theory of “public interest.”214 
The case involved a class action against Reichert Industries Ltd.215 On 
June 7, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled on the appeal filed by the class 
action plaintiff and the appeal filed by Mr. Dan Reichert against the Dis-
trict Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court Ruling outlined principles defin-
ing the term “controlling shareholder” for accountability purposes. Ar-
guably it is a “public good” to have a clear “normative [adjudication] and 
for the court to make [statements] sufficiently clear that business can 
abide by these rules and avoid legal risk.”216 The Supreme Court agreed 
                                                                                                  
 211. Because of lack of data it was not possible to verify how long it usually takes ISA 
to review and decide on such cases and whether this time is too excessive. According to 
ISA, ISA Plenum (recall that the Enforcement Department of ISA is charged with formu-
lating recommendations to ISA Plenum as to applications to finance such claims) usually 
convenes once a month and in 2009, ISA Plenum held eight meetings and the committee 
for imposing fines as per class action suits held three meetings. See ANNUAL REPORT 
2009, supra note 167, at 2. 
 212. ANNUAL REPORT 2009, supra note 167. 
 213. In the first, Case 1498/04, a class action was brought against M.P.A. Mediterra-
nean Assets and Investments Ltd. and Mishor Hahof Construction and Assets Ltd. 
The claim stated that the consideration awarded in return for the company’s 
shares, as part of a forced purchase offer made by way of a full purchase offer 
to shareholders, was less than their fair value. After the proceedings in this case 
were suspended for a period of three years, at the end of 2007 the parties signed 
a settlement agreement. According to the agreement, which was approved by 
the Court in April 2008, NIS 0.20 per share were added for each share held by 
the shareholders on January 13, 2004 (date of the full purchase offer). 
ISA, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, 134 (May 3, 2009), 
http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_4543.pdf. 
 214. See supra Section 2.2.2. 
 215. ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 213, at 134–35. 
 216. GENN, supra note 92, at 74; see also supra Section 2.2.2. and in particular cases 
mentioned supra note 123.  
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that Mr. Reichert was one of the Company’s “controlling shareholders” 
and thus held him liable for plaintiff’s damages.217 
4. Why Not Go All the Way? 
Finally, it is worth asking why instead of simply funding derivative ac-
tions in cases that are in the public interest, should ISA not litigate these 
cases itself once it received a request to do so. Indeed, “there are times 
where regulators may be compelled to step in the shoes of private indi-
viduals seeking recourse through the court systems.”218 This may arise, 
for example, when there is “no economic incentive for private parties to 
proceed with action; limited access to information to support action by 
private parties; or when actionable conduct may have impact on wider 
public interest and market confidence.”219 Put simply: if the rationale is 
public interest and market confidence then why should ISA not litigate 
these cases itself, not just lend financial support to them? In order to as-
sist ISA, there is no reason, for instance, why an independent expert may 
not, in appropriate cases, be allowed to investigate and advise ISA on the 
action220 (naturally this requires allocating further financial resources 
too). After all, 
much serious misconduct by directors [such as bribery and insider deal-
ing] is often inherently unlikely to be detected by shareholders acting 
alone. [Derivative actions] involving these forms of wrongdoing often 
piggyback on criminal governmental or internal corporate investiga-
tion. Indeed, the surge of derivative action litigation in Japan has been 
partly explained by such piggybacking on government[] enforce-
ment.221 
                                                                                                  
 217. ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 213, at 134. The Supreme Court Ruling “pre-
sented various methods for calculating damages due in a class action suit, and determined 
that, in this case, the appropriate method is the ‘out of pocket’ method, which is based on 
the damages principles prescribed under tort law—restoration of the status quo ante.” Id. 
 218. MALAY. SEC. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 119, at 65. 
 219. Id. 
 220. As the case in South African and Australian legislation. See supra note 87. As 
Gelter points out, continental European laws have a mechanism that is intended to allevi-
ate the information asymmetry with respect to corporate wrongdoing, namely the minor-
ity right to have the court appoint a special auditor. The required percentage to trigger 
such an appointment varies between jurisdictions. See Martin Gelter, Why do Share-
holder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 843 
(2012). 
 221. Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in 
Shareholder Interests, 82 GEO. L.J. 1764, 1763–64 (1993–1994). In Japan, “information 
disclosure is not terribly abundant; shareholder rights to view corporate records are predi-
cated on the holder having at least 3% of the shares; cause must be shown to appoint an 
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In the U.K., the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 grants the 
FSA “powers to take proceedings in the civil and criminal courts to deal 
with misconduct relating to regulated activities.”222 The FSA “can issue 
civil proceedings in the High Court against firms and individuals, includ-
ing those who are not members of the regulated community.”223 There 
are several civil actions that the FSA can pursue.224 The main actions 
include “asking the High Court to grant injunctions” (for example to pre-
vent a person from conducting regulated activities without authorisation 
or prevent a person from committing market abuse),225 “ordering the 
payment of restitution, and granting insolvency orders.”226 “In Hong 
Kong, the power to assist aggrieved individuals has been further widened 
to allow the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (“HKSFC”) 
to petition the court for a remedy where the affairs of a listed company 
are being conducted in a manner, which is oppressive or unfairly prejudi-
cial to the interest of its shareholders.”227 The same arrangement exists 
under U.K. law.228 In a recent Hong-Kong case, the court ordered a com-
pany to recover the losses attributable to an alleged misconduct from its 
directors (for breach of fiduciary duties and conduct unfairly prejudicial 
to the interest of the shareholders by entering into transactions which 
                                                                                                  
outside inspector; and pretrial discovery is nonexistent.” West, supra note 19; see 
REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 190 (discussing the case involving 
Allied Irish Banks Plc). Additional factors, mainly in the form of financial incentives, are 
discussed in REISBERG, THEORY AND OPERATION, supra note 5, at 222–73. 
 222. Enforcement in the Civil and Criminal Courts, FIN. SERVICES AUTH. (Apr. 4, 
2010), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/doing/regulated/law/focus/courts.shtml; see Finan-
cial Services and Markets, 2000, c.8, § 8(1) (Eng.). 
 223. Enforcement in the Civil and Criminal Courts, supra note 222. 
 224. Id. 
 225. In “May 2011 the FSA had, for the first time, obtained a final injunction restrain-
ing an individual from committing market abuse.” FSA Bans and Fines Self Employed 
Trader £700,000 for Market Abuse, FED. SEC. ADMIN. (June 14, 2011), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2011/053.shtml. 
 226. See Enforcement in the Civil and Criminal Courts, supra note 222. 
 227. Id.; see Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2003) Cap. 571, § 214 (H.K.). 
 228. According to the Companies Act 2006 
if it appears to the Secretary of State that . . .(a) the company’s affairs are being 
or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests 
of members generally or of some part of its members, (b) or an actual or pro-
posed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its be-
half) is or would be so prejudicial, he may apply to the court by petition for an 
order under this Part. 
Companies Act 2006 § 995. This power under this Section has rarely, if ever, been used. 
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resulted in significant losses).229 Interestingly, it was the HKSFC itself 
which petitioned the court for an order compelling the company to sue its 
directors. 
As was noted recently, “the Hong Kong case illustrates the instances 
where regulators may be compelled to initiate action on behalf of share-
holders to reinforce public confidence in the market.”230 
Although these powers can help reinforce seal-dealing, naturally, they 
do not come without some drawback. “Firstly there is concern over regu-
lators running the risk of intervening in the affairs of the company and 
secondly, such actions by regulators may result in shareholders becoming 
over reliant on regulators to take action on their behalf thus exacerbating 
the reluctance to institute private action.”231 Then there are also the usual 
problems of limited resources and funding available to regulators232 and 
the political and interest groups pressures233 that would stand in the 
way.234 Indeed, these concerns have caused some jurisdictions to empha-
size “the need to promote private enforcement actions by shareholders 
[instead] and has also caused some common law countries to consider 
facilitating shareholders class action . . . .in order to overcome these con-
straints and to provide greater recourse to remedy for wrongdoings.”235 
CONCLUSION 
It would be easy to dismiss Amendment 16—whereby public funding 
may be provided to fund derivative claims when ISA is convinced there 
is a public interest—as strictly a private Israeli affair. After all, it was 
introduced to complement the current funding mechanisms available un-
der Israeli law, to deal with an allegedly (but unfounded) suboptimal en-
forcement levels, and to fit within Israeli companies’ highly concentrated 
ownership structure and the Israeli capital market. But this Author be-
lieves such dismissal would be a mistake. Dismissal overlooks three ma-
                                                                                                  
 229. Sec. & Futures Comm’n v. Cheung Keng Ching [2010], H.C.M.O. 1869/2008 
(Mar. 18, 2010) (Legal Reference System) (H.K.). 
 230. MALAY. SEC. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 119, at 66. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See supra Section 2.2.3.1 c. 
 233. See supra Section 2.2.3.1 b. 
 234. There is also the problem that ISA, or any other regulatory body for that matter, 
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 235. MALAY. SEC. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 119, at 64–65. The Malaysian Securi-
ties Commission “recommends the establishment of a working group to study the feasi-
bility of litigation funding by third party to assist investors in instituting private enforce-
ment actions.” Id. at 67. 
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jor benefits. First, the adoption of Amendment 16 in Israel, if successful, 
opens up an entirely novel domain for policy makers to address the fund-
ing problem in derivative action litigation, namely that of a public regu-
lator and public funding for these private actions. Secondly, the formula-
tion of the solution, combining a private enforcement aided by a public 
body (i.e. privately initiated and pursued litigation which are publicly 
funded), indicates that the response may lie in a more practical and 
pragmatic way forward which cuts across the traditional public/private 
dichotomy. Finally, the Israeli solution may offer a fresh strategy to be 
employed in order to create proper incentives to litigate and thus ad-
dresses a major concern in the literature on the theory of litigation, 
namely, the basic problem that the private incentives to litigate may di-
verge from what is socially desirable . 
This Paper addressed derivative action funding problems in a different 
taxonomy. The fact that despite various fee mechanisms and fee-favoring 
rules available under the Israeli law, parties still would not pursue these 
claims exemplifies the underproduction of positive externalities. If fund-
ing is more forthcoming it is more likely that private actions would be 
pursued by aggrieved parties. Put simply, the policy underlying Amend-
ment 16 reveals a new truth: when individuals are given financial support 
by a public body to litigate their claims, it is likely in recognition that 
these lawsuits would produce collateral social benefits. The new mecha-
nism helps produce these benefits by internalizing a cost to a public body 
(ISA) that consequently enables the lawsuits to be brought. 
Admittedly, these are still early days and time will tell whether this 
scheme under Israeli law can, or should, be followed elsewhere. Indeed, 
as was seen above, it is an imperfect and flawed mechanism and there are 
numerous difficulties that need to be addressed and overcome if this is to 
be implemented successfully and make any impact in practice. But so are 
most other mechanisms of funding, each subject to a unique benefits and 
costs analysis. The addition of this analysis to the scholarly literature 
serves several functions. Among these functions is the illumination of 
how a derivative action is more like other types of class action cases than 
generally presumed, private and public enforcement can play a comple-
mentary roles to each other, and, under this analysis, relatively unimpor-
tant the compensatory aspects of the derivative action case are compared 
to its other social functions. This last point is particularly important be-
cause the externality story of the derivative actions case sets the ground-
work for a more general understanding of the common feature of these 
suits that could, in turn, facilitate private litigation as an important con-
trol tool. 
